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ABSTRACT 
Equilihrium 
World excess demand funct 
written as a 
country an,~ 
ion of their relat 
tari rates of the 
1. 
two goods may be 
pr in one 
countries, The 
condition for dynamic stability 
determine the rection of 'the 
lows one to unambiguous 
iee in 
ion of a eus un New normal case on 
conclusive re 
the terms of t 
ts on trade diversion versus trade creation 9 
Subsequent 
welfare are 
the customs union 
t d, 
fixed terms of 
2 , 
trade is examined, A new condition on Trade Indifference 
surfaces is derived as a consequence of the restrictions 
necessary on individual utility functions for community 
indifference curves to exist. This information provides 
new and simple results for the small two member union which 
are generalised to small unions with an arbitrary number of 
members for tariff adjustments of any magnitude. 
It is proved that the composite goods theorem holds 
under distortions and may be applied to the many good small 
customs union. With many goods thereby reduced to two the 
results of the previous paragraph apply. 
[ ii] Estimation 
A general equilibrium model of the effect of tariff 
changes upon national income at factor cost is set up and 
estimated, Forecasts are made of the effects of a modifica-
tion to NAFTA should New Zealand eliminate tariffs on 
certain Australian goods. Subject to error a small increase 
in income generated in the NZ manufacturing sector IS pre-
dicted, It is concluded that the protectionists' case is 
not sustained and that NZ could adopt an across the board 
\ 
approach to renegotiations of NAFTA instead of tariff by 
tariff procedures, 
3. 
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Customs Unions 
theoretical interest and 
ir attraction 
ir actic 
regularity int d 0 countries tari s 
discriminatory tari ement 
rmation 
ari e 
s 
r their 
importance. The 
dules by those 
theorist 
because 
the di 
t 1 allow him to overcome 
culties p lems involving the 
theo of se 
of some moment whe 
t. In 
ount 
d not 
real world it is a question 
Id enter a free trade 
area or whe r it The econometrician in this 
case is ced wi a problem of slgnl Gance, first in improv-
ing on the estimat models of other. workers and second in 
finding a method of est ion which does justice to the model 
he has developed. writer 
Unions for these reasons 
their empiri ir 
been drawn to Customs 
the present piece treats both 
oretical aspects. 
The 1 widely scattered literature on customs 
unions is not surveyed this study. Instead a care 
comparison of results is presented where one of tics 
studied bears on the work of a theorist in eld. A 
equil rium analys is is pursued ·with pe 5 ater 
i gour than has been cus eld. A 
cons of the general equilibrium d 
e ri A rion applied to the Ii 
i the problem gained by the st ators of 
librium models have been as ed. 0 
the literature has been at 
e pr to Lipsey's book and en 
exe d. James Meade & Harry G. rst 
6, 
important workers in the field subsequent to Viner made 
notable advances which are not acknowledged in this study 
because of the Lipsey cut, In any case their work is 
implicit since it underpins Lipsey's who, retro ect. did 
not progress past them, The approach just described to 
the literature selects for particular attention the results 
reported in the books by Lipsey~ by Vanek and by Kemp who are 
the second wave theorists, making a general equilibrium 
attack on the customs union problem, Perspective may be 
gained, and an overview obtained, if the innovative aspects 
of the present piece are listed, Each chapter displays one 
innovation, It occurred to the writer that though Lipsey, 
Vanek & Kemp were working with stable models they had not 
made use of stabili conditions, By using the usual 
dynamic assumptions Chapter I succeeds in finally ironing out 
several important~ but previously clouded, issues on which 
the three writers are at variance between each other in the 
large customs union problem, The key idea in Chapter II is 
one which appears to have escaped notice in many areas of 
trade theory where community indifference curves are involved, 
If community indifference curves are to exist a restriction 
is implied on individual utility functions, The nature of 
the restrict~0n is such as to preclude inferior goods and with 
that imbroglio cleared away results become unambiguous and 
simple for the small custom~ union, Chapter III deals with 
the small customs union trading many commodities, There has 
not been a great deal of work done on this problem which is 
made the more complex by the pairwise stitution and com-
plementarity relationships between three or more goo The 
7 . 
thought exploited in Chapter III is that the pairwise 
problem may be solved by introducing the 
theorem in such a way as to convert the system into a two 
good model of a small customs union. Simple re ts are 
then obtained, The object of the f 1 ch te is to 
present a general equilibrium model of the change in 
national income at factor prices which may result from a 
customs union and then to forecast the effect on factor 
incomes in the New Zealand manufacturing sector when the 
New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement is modified, 
Reco ition that a tariff change affects the equilibrium 
price and the quantity supplied of a factor is the central 
idea here and a simultaneous equation approach to the 
estimation of the general equilibrium factor supplies and 
factor prices is adopted, from which a prediction on changes 
in factor incomes is made. Subject to the forecast's error 
the outcome is of significance in the New Zealand debate on 
protection, A problem should be mentioned here in that the 
theoretical difficulties of the distribution of the tariff 
revenue, faced and resolved in Chapters I, II, III - the 
theoretical parts of the study - are ignored in the empirical 
chapter, The reason why this problem has been Ie untouched 
is that y1_e real world the rules by which factors are 
affected by the distribution of the tariff proceeds are 
unknown. 
8. 
CHAPTER 1 
THE STANDARD THEORY OF CUSTOMS UNIONS 
The work of Kemp (9), Negishi (15) and Vanek (20) 
has carried the theory of economic integration forward 
since Lipsey (11) surveyed the field in 1960. Inter-country 
groupings have increased in number since that time and each 
grouping has brought to light new problems which many 
writers have examined; an important branch of the literature 
of the 1960's is devoted to the special features of trading 
arrangements between economies which are poor. Despite the 
attention the topic has received, results are still a morass 
of special cases, 
Particularly noticeable in customs union theory is 
the way successive authors have relied upon, corrected - and 
extended - the results of their predecessors, The line of 
succession from Viner (22) and Meade (15), via Lipsey (12) 
through to Vanek (21) and Kemp (9) clearly illustrates the 
process, Further corrections, simplifications - and exten-
sions - are presented in this study. One extension is the 
explicit introduction of stability conditions which inject 
hitherto dormant information, thereby correcting earlier 
results and providing new ones. Modifications of earlier 
results on welfare, on the terms of trade and on the trade 
\ 
9 , 
creating and trade diverting unions will be notad; the 
distinction between these last two, it tUrns out, is not 
required for the terms of trade problem, 
Negishi's paper (16) probes the Paretian conditions 
to reveal the optimal relations between partners' consump-
tion taxes, subsidies and tariffs, though Takayama (20, 
p,471-472) has described Negishi's "piecemeal approach" to 
the theory of second best as being handled, "in a rather 
subtle way so that the real significance of this point is 
not too clear from his discussion", Principle emphasis in 
Vanek is on the terms of trade problem while Kemp's 
orientation is towards welfare changes, Both writers 
recognise that the two matters are related and the inter-
relation is intensified here. 
Vanek and Kemp derive results through graphical 
techniques requiring, and in this respect they are similar 
to Negishi, community indifference curves, An advantage 
the diagrammatic approach has over the calculus is that it 
accommodates discrete changes in tariffs while the calculus 
does not, Inferior goods constitute a major problem in 
stating graphically derived results, even in the two 
commodity case, Although non-graphical methods of course 
do not eliminate inferior goods, these goods can be more 
easily accommodated and results more simply stated, with 
algebraic methods, The usual requirement of no inferior 
goods is not a necessary assumption for some results, it 
will be shown, though Giffen goods will be proscribed for 
the world economy as a whole, 
One reason for adhering to the two-good-three-country 
case a reason rhaps deeper than the convenient two 
10. 
dimensions of a di i on one pattern of trade 
is then admissable on ion of a arr~ngement 
between two countries st a ird absence of 
public distortions. pe tted pattern of trade is 
one partner i is01 ed i country. To 
loit this convenience to preserve couparability with 
much of the literature cited only two goods and three 
countr s will be lowed model to be developed. 
DomesticP ces 
Membe of a customs union has real effects on an 
economy stemming, 1 ely, from the induced changes in 
domestic prices. Knowledge of the changes in domestic 
prices is thus a e-requisite for analyzing many of these 
real e cts, accordingly, the standard model of customs 
unions is set out here and examined for its content on 
directional variations in local prices. Work prior to 
present piece has not succeeded in determin what happens 
to domestic prices. 
One member of the union is isolated non union 
countries the standard model of customs unions (9, 12, 15, 
20) will be A which exports d 1 to and 
art o from Country B. Non-member C arts 
good 1 to and impo s good 0 from B. A cons e of this 
hi ly ci c pattern of trade in st 1 is 
t excess demand functions r e count t 
ticular 
F~ 
1 
rms (1) 
F~'(pa t ) 
1. 'ab 
(1) se relations are derived 
(1) 
at 
Fb. b b ) , = F. (P ,t b 1tb ,tb ,t b 1 1 a a c c 
F~ =: 
1 
c c F.(P ,t b) 
1 c 
i=O,l 
11. 
(2) 
(3 ) 
where F~ is country V's excess demand for good i, pV is the 
1 
relative price of good 1 in Country V, (V=a,b,c) and tvr lS 
Country V's ad valorem tariff on imports from country r. 
Tariff links (2) between prices are present in the model, 
pb '" (l+t
ab ) (l+tba ) pa 
(4) 
and may be substituted into equations (1), (3) in order to 
obtain the world equilibrium excess demands, Fi' in terms of 
pb and the 
F~ (pa,t
ab ) 
tariffs; the procedure is 
b b . 
+ F. (P • t b' tb ,tb ,t b) 1 a a c c 
b 
:;; F. (P ,t b' tb ,tb ,t b) 1 . a a c c i=O 1 
= 0 
+ F~ 
1 
(5) 
Under assumptions which are not stringent, involving the 
stability of the system and allowing inferior goods 
(negative income effects) in up to two cGuntries, definitive 
signs of price changes upon the formation of a customs 
union can be obtained from system (5). 
Introducing, at this point, the standard dynamic 
assumption of price formatibn, 
pb = g[Fl(pb,tab,tba.tbc,tcb)] 
and the Routh-Hurwitz conditions for stability, which 
degenerate to 
(2) These relations are derived in the appendix 
aF 
where 1 
1 '" 
< 0 
ClF V 
__ 1, v=a, b, c 
apv 
12. 
+ 
) 
CD) 
and notic that the total rivative of wo d excess 
s 
and 
r good 1 from equation (5) is, 
dF 1 
:::: 0 
"'pv 
a 1 it is 
~ 
vr 
b a b IdP + (hlab+hlab)dt 
(7) 
nature of a customs union agreement 
seen that the right d side of 
(7) may be expressed terms of the tari 5 and dpb. 
procedure is to use equation 
and 
(4) to ta 
pb(dtba(l+tab)+dtab(l+tba) J 
((l+t )(1+tba ))2 
(8) 
(9) 
stituting equations (8) and (9) into 
equation (7) and solving for dpb one obtains the e 
customs union has on Country Bls 
t b) (1 + tb )] 2 
a a 
b 
-------- + f 1 
(l+t bJ (1+tb ) a a 
< 0 
b 
+ f + 1 
ices, 
(10) 
ct the 
13~ 
The sign of relation (10) follows from; /(i) a negative 
denominator g by st iIi 
on the assumption excess demand 
normally to price, (iii) dt 
ion (6), (ii) f~<O 
Country A responds 
e Countries A and 
B reciprocally re 
h&l hb hb 0 
-lab lab' lba> 
tari 
,dtba< 0 s 
(iv) 
e app 
come type effects 
to this chapter. 
Two of the income e cts v 1 or hlvr terms could be 
negative if they were 0 et by ot rs. 
In Country C ice of od 1 also Is; from (9) 
and (10) 
(11) 
< 0 
Price in Country A rises because, us g equation (1), 
a a a a dF O fOdP +hOabdtab 
> 0 
The positive sign of (12) is proved later 
(17); in addition we have 
h~ab>O from the appendix 
dtab<O as result of union 
a 
and fO>O s ce 0 
(12) 
1 are 
substitutes, Therefore, by the signs of (12) of its 
components 
dpa>O 
A trading arrangement may be of the form ter 
membe tariffs are dis-similar, the e ct be to 
pre rences to members while non-member countries are 
exposed to a different degree of discrimination. Ie; 
tbc> >t b>t b ; 0; is the type of discr 
a a c 
o tariff 
pattern operated under the British Imperial Preference 
, where countries B & A are interpreted as U,K. 
& y" Empire, Provided the tariff reductions 
stems of is type are of a magnitude p tted by 
14. 
usual methods of comparative statics adopted here the 
analysis yields a simpliste interpretation of tne effects 
-
of such highly discriminatory agreements. A different type 
of customs union provides most favoured nation treatment to 
outsiders and provides a complete preference for members, 
e.g. tb >t b = tb = 0, a rearrangement of tariffs which is 
c a a 
likely to involve finite movements and likely to pose 
interpretative difficulties for the comparative statics 
approach. As long as well behaved functions are assumed 
throughout relation (10) holds for every initial level of 
tariffs so that results are preserved for the discrete case 
by viewing it as a series of small reductions in members' 
tariffs. 
In summary, it has been demonstrated that in the 
member country isolated from the rest of the world the 
domestic price of the exportable rises upon union. However 
in Country C, outside the union, the domestic price of the 
export good falls. Union member B experiences a fall in the 
local price of its imported good. These changes in domestic 
prices have been established directly and the firmer con-
clusions were obtained because the indeterminacies, 
associated with the customary approaches through terms of 
trade changes Jr trade creation and trade diversion, have 
been bypassed. Their significance lies in the resolution 
of two pressures; the downw?rd pressure tariff concessions 
have on the domestic price of members' different imports and 
the upward pressure on members' prices of tariff discrimina-
tion ggainst the outsider. 
15. 
Heckscher Oh1 E ts 
One of the results of s r-Ohl model is 
that a unique relat exists between p t prices and 
factor rewards, The un relation can be coupled with 
the res ts just t ned on price e c s of customs 
unions. When price of rises the price of the 
tor used ly ts manufacture increases as a 
consequence of cons ant returns to scale and of no factor 
revers s H 0 1. The domestic price of good 1 
has been shown no ly to increase after union for member 
A and price of ctor ense there in industry 1, 
say labour, acco ly rises, But since pb,pc fall 
real Countries Band C declines. On Heckscher-Ohlin 
assumptions lour's absolute and relative income rises in 
the member country trading only within the Union and Is 
in 
of 
S 
a r Union country and in the rest of the world. 
rms of Trade 
Changes in the Union's terms of tra 
world may be specified by recall a 
Union's terms of trade is the world relat 
ort good' the ratio of quantities tra d 
d Le. 
p 
e tcb is constant under ement 
[ pCfc pCfC]dpC 
dp 1 0 a 1 
'" (pc) 
0 
wi th rest 
f ition. 
p ice of 
rest 
( 
its 
of 
16, 
where f~ '" 
1 
Complexities from inferiority set to on? 
side, where they are usually placed, the necessary and 
! 
sufficient condition for the Union's terms of trade to 
improve is pleasantly simple; when converted to ela~ticity 
terms. It has just been shown that dpc < 0 for the normal 
case so a necessary and sufficient conditi0n, in the normal 
case, for the Union's terms of trade to improve is that the 
bracketed term in the numerator of (13) takes a negative 
value. Introduce the elasticities of demand for imports 
and supply of exports (3), respectively nC and E C , and the 
condition from (13) becomes 
(14 ) 
< 0 
Country C exports good 1 so pc 1 < 0, 
pc 
0 > o . The inequali ty 
in (14) requires 
c 
+ 
c 
< o . n E 
This necessary and sufficient condition does, in fact, apply 
because it is a widely known property of the elasticities 
in international trade theory that 
'c c n + E ::::-1. 
(3) r- 1 fC 
C CJ J~O pc 0 pc n - :Ie pc dpC Po 0 
opc pc fC 
E C 1 "" 
1 pc 
-
opc c pc PI 0 
17, 
The result, new to the literature as are those on 
domestic price es i t terms of trade normally 
move in favour of union. 
ersion 
Since ner' work di cus ion ha entred round the 
effect the Customs Union on th the rest of the 
world. Welfare results d on r e Union creates 
trade with the rest of e world or whe r t is 
diverted, Kemp (9, p.31) and (21, p,32-33) have dis-
carded Viner's relative cost con tof tr creation and 
trade diversion in favour of a de tion based on changes 
in the quantities traded with the rest of the world. Using 
expressions (3 ) and ( 11) we nd, in normal case, 
c fCdp c 0 dFO :::: < 0 
and 
dp c := fCdp c > a 1 1 ( 5) 
Inequalities (15) show that rest of wo d t 
imports from the Union shrink as do rest f wo d's 
exports to the Union (F~ is negative). A 
trade wi th the rest of tlle world occurs; 
contraction 
is t 
diversion in the normal case f S8 
(22 p, 11 contrary to Vanek1s 1'e (21 p.212) 
one outcome is no more like than r wi 
Union it is easily seen, expands no cas 
(1), (10) I with 
aFb ':\pb 
fb 0 hb 
(L 0 
~ 
0 Ovr 
18, 
f~dpb -I- o J hb d' ,. Oba Lba 
< 0 ( 1 () ) 
and world equilibrium t for good 0 requires that 
Incorporating (1 ) and (16) we have, 
) 
( 17) 
> a 
or, there is an expansion member A's imports er union, 
Turning to the movement AI S orts, utilising 
positive value for dpa est Ii d as a consequence of 
Ii (12), equati (1) yiel 
< a (18) 
implying that member A's exports A it will 
be recalled trades only inside un e A's 
imports and exports both increase there is an ansion of 
with the union. 
Member's lfare 
Kemp (9 p,32-33) is carefully a ti his treat-
ment of ~ormal case; he finds that ion 1 terms of 
tr rove or deteriorate en on 1', a 
constant world prices, ther~ is t creation or a 
rsion. WeI re res ts on the distribut of ga 
losses union are equivalently indefini te s to 
on presence of trade creation d i t 
ini ial wo ld p ices. 
19. 
Vacillation over trade creation and trade diversion 
at initial prices has its root in the inherent limitations 
of the grapllical methods and ought to be eliminated by an 
algebraic approach. We must determine whethe~ there is 
trade diversion or trade creation at constan rId prices. 
c By relations (4) the connections between w~rld price, P , 
and prices within the union are 
(l+t ) (l+t ) 
ab ba (19) 
and 
Express each member's excess demand in terms of the world 
price by substitut g from (19) into (1) (2). After the 
substitutions the union excess demand in terms of the world 
price is 
and the union excess demand changes by l 8F~ 8F~ + 
apc apc 
+ [~Pf 
Cltb 11 
+ 
apa 8pb 
+ - 1 .- 1 
+ 1 dp C 
. tab' tba Clt at ab 
1 dtb a 
f pa 
h a hb 1-· + - ~~~ lab - lab I+t b 
a 
1 dt ab 
pC,tba 
(20) 
, 
20. I 
after applying the composite ction rule. Our interest 
is in the excess demand at fixed world prices after tariffs 
\ 
decline i.e. the situation where dp c = 0, dt b,dtb < 0 a a 
f a f a 
dpu a ~ b dt + hb -1 dt '" hlabFhlab 1 l+t ab Iba ., +t ba 
ab - ba 
< 0 (21) 
Hence at constant wo d prices the union's excess demand for 
its import is reduced the tariff change; there is trade 
diversion. 
The upshot of this is to relieve the standard model 
of customs unions of its abmivalence over trade creation, 
or trade diversion at both initial and final prices. 
There is trade d rsion at both price sets - see inequal-
ities (15) and (21) - and this is a refinement of Vanek's 
position. It is also a refinement and clarification of 
Kemp (9, p.32-33) who was unable to isolate trade diversion 
from trade creation at constant prices. A gain has been 
achieved in simplicity by closing off the possibility of 
trade creation. Of greater value than this is the coherence 
brought to Kemp's welfare conclusions. He showed (9, p.35) 
that with trade creation one member necessarily suffers. 
Eliminating ~rade creation eliminates the necessity that the 
welfare of one member falls. 
Kemp showed that, 
"Strong inferiority aside the exchange of trade 
preferences by A & B may result either the 
creation of trade or the diversion of their joint 
trade with the rest of the world. least one 
member must benefit from club membership. If the 
21. 
exchange of p t cre ion 
that member t within club must 
benefit, er must rr SUl.Ier. If 
exchange of p ren re ts in trade d rs 
either member or b th bene to il 
(9, p,34~35) 
The result is now more ite and reduces essent 
ially to Kempis last ent ceo 
the preference results 
t diversion, e1 l' member or both may bene t,1I 
Had he fully summari ed weI re results he ob 
ta d Kemp would have mentioned at one member may, but 
need not suffer (9, p.34). 
Conclusion 
Four of the issues at centre 0 customs union 
o been taken up, e issues are (i) the e cts 
union on domestic price count es (ii) 
e vari ions Union's terms of t ( i) the 
extent a i t is created or t ed, 
(iv) memb s' weI Writing exce s functions 
in ea count as dependent on dome 
Count B analytical twist which st-
ing res t, The results on the t for 
the normal a e a'X'e (i) the domestic p t-
able i e e A lIs in e B 
rest f wo d' (ii) e rove 
so of worl e 
is d rest f 0 __ 1,110 d at i ces 
22, 
at final prices; (iv) the elimination of trade creation 
has eliminated the necessity of a decline 
welfare, 
one member's 
23, 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I 
Excess Demand Functions 
Shoven (19) has recently proved the existence of 
equilibrium using excess demand functions in a world 
characterized by variable supplies, by many governments 
and by multiple tariff ates. His treatment is general 
and includes the excess demand functions used in the text 
for the customs union members and for the rest of the world, 
Certain variables do not enter those excess demand functions 
for some countries, in the customs union problem under 
consideration, and a derivation is provided, For the 
assumptions necessary to ensure the existence of, and the 
continuity of, the excess demand functions as well as other 
technical requirements the reader is referred to Shoven. 
Since the methods of infinitestimal calculus are used here 
the further restrictions necessary to dlstingui between 
local D' al maxima are assumed to apply. The deriva-
tions which follow are for an exchange economy, though the 
text treats the variable stipply problem; variable production 
may be incorporated in the usual general equilibrium manner 
of Shoven, 
Consume j t A maximises 
A.1 
25, 
where xij ' Yij are respectively j 's consumptibn and endow-
ment of good i. pI is the accounting price of good i in 
v Country V and R. is jls share of Country V's tariff revenue. 
J 
Solving the first or r conditions from (A,I) provides j's 
demand functions 
]C., "" x .. (paO,p~t9YO·9Yl·9R~) 1J 1J - J J J i"09 1 
which gre te to Count A's market demand functions, 
In the aggregated demand functions, only the totals 
of the endowments, ·a and tariff proceeds, R » matter 
A dependence is present in the tariff proceeds in that 
2:R~ 
. J 
J 
A.4 
where t ·b IS A's ad valorem rate of tariff on imports~from 
a 
B and the bracketed term is A's excess demand for the import-
ed good, The dependence is removed by using the relations 
between accounting prices the three countries, the re-
lations being 
pa 
"" 
(I+t )pb 
0 ab 0 A,S 
b (l+tba)P~ Pel . ~ '" (1+tbc) P~ A,6 
pC 
"" (I+t ) pb 0 0 A.7 
Substitute A.S into A.4 to obtain 
A.8 
Equation A.8 may now be substituted a A.3 then supres-
s g t constant endowments solving provides the m et 
26, 
demand functions 
i=O, L A,9 
converting to relative prices in the usual way with good 0 
the numeraire equations A.9 become 
A,10 
from which we obtain A's excess demand functions, equations 
(1) in the text" as ending only on A's relative price 
and A's tariff on imports from B, 
Fa. '" Fa Cpa t ) 
1 j 'ab i=O,1 A,11 
Country C has an identical trading pattern to Country 
A and the same procedure provides C's demand functions 
x~ X~(pc c '" Pl,t cb ) 1 1 0 A,12 
and the excess demands 
F~ ::: F~(PC,t b) i=O,1 
1 1 c 
A,13 
Country B has a dis-similar trading pattern yielding 
excess demar..ds which are complicated by the receipt of 
tariff revenue from two sources at two rates 
A,14 
In A.14, substitute for x~ from A.9 and also for X~ from 
A,12 obta lng 
Using A.S, A,6, A,7 the previous equation, Rb may be ex-
pressed as 
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At the appropriate place in the aggregation procedure for 
C B b · h b . f b. ountry su stitute tea ave expreSSIon or Rand con-
vert to relative prices finally to obtain 
which are equations (2) in the text. 
from 
Relationships Between Prices 
The relative price f good 
pb 
"" 
equation 
pb po. 
1 
'" 
(1+t ) 1. pD ba po 
0 0 
A.6. Substituting 
po. 
(1+t ) (l+t )~ 
ab ba po. 
o 
1 
for 
Similarly, 
b p = (I+tb )(l+t b)pc. .C c 
Signs of Partial Derivatives 
i=0,1 
in Country B 
pb 
0 from A.S, 
is 
These partial derivatives show the effects of 
A.IS 
A.16 
tariff changes when domestic rice is fixed so that the 
substitution effects are not operating. The partial 
derivatives are ome effects, operating through 
changes in tariff revenue,_ and are shown to have the same 
sign as the income effect (positive in 
(i) 
normal case). 
b .' P ~[b a 
tbe t 
i=0,1 A,17 
28, 
The s e i partial ivative 
emphasise a 11 Ie 1 ' t , are xed, 
Equations A,IS, A, 
(1+ ) (1 t ( a) A.18 
i g la1 de-
rivat A,17 we ee 
ab reases 
pa 
and leaves pC un dQ t thus 
has an unchanged prl Count C an 
increased price in lying Country A, orters in 
C have no incentive to their orts to B s e no 
terms change in the first equali of A,18. importers 
in B reduce their rts from Count A upplier 
whose price increases. Bls total orts 
tariff rates are constant in the p i so 
Bis tariff revenue declines. When distr o consumers 
Country B the smaller tariff revenue, at red 
constant domestic price, sets up come e ct 
normally reduce excess demands. e a cl t 
reduction in b Thus h~ >0 causes a F. , 1 1 
(ii) iab 
dF~ (pa tab) 
d pa 
i 0 A.19 
lative price is constant i t 
there is no subst tution con tion 
or pro tion and that A'saccounting ices move e 
p rtions. uation A,5 was 
l+t 
ab 
Total tari ff revenue is re turned to co I) S llll)l' rs and 
~ pa 
bLab 0 tabPO= is the tariff revenue from one unit of 
l+tab 
imports. The inequality indicates that imports can not be 
self financing because the tariff revenue they generate 
is always less than the domestic prices. Thus with 
fixed relative prices, an increase in imports would put 
country A beyond its budget constraint. Imports, therefore, 
do not increase though the tariff rate t b in the partial 
a 
derivative decreases. Country A's tariff revenue therefore 
declines and the consequent income effects at the fixed 
relative prices attach the positive sign to A.19, h~ b>O la 
(iii) h~b '" La 
Notice that tariff proceeds per unit, 
declines and apply a similar argu-
b 
ment to that used for A.l~ hOb >0. 
1 a 
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2 
THE ANALYTICS OF A CUSTOMS UNION 
There are not many tho go alg r treat 
treatments of the cha ac r st cs of tra 
Meade (15), as s r par s of ternational 
t thea. made basic contr ions to t of 
customs unions, with a ful grated rna ematical 
roach, as long ago as 1955. While s (12) is 
possibly the exception, although the main metho of his 
work are graphical and verbal, the next mathematically inte-
grated s of the topic came in 1972 with Takayamals book 
(20). Takayama lays down a twenty one equation communi 
i 
two a 
renee C1JrVe model for the two member union, t g 
wi h the rest of the world, and obtains few 
r ef r. ishi (16) manipulates the marg results 
al c tions an imum in the social wel e sense. 
Hi rna 1 
ion so yiel 
ami on 
not e Ii it 
conclusions 
and no 
r 
ema 1 
treat pro ion 
normative b 
sitive si 
can 
of econ-
neglec of customs unions 
tel'S it may be that there has 
t-
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been an unnecessary complexity in the structure of the 
problem - Takayama does require a lot of equations - or 
an incomplete or improper formulation of the relevant 
questions. However, this treatment will show that a 
proportion of the problems so far studied in customs union 
theory can be expressed in a simple analytic form and 
precise results can be obtained from a model of few 
equations, The approach used is slightly innovative and 
it is as well first to look briefly at the formal statement 
of the problem in the usual methodology. 
The customs union problem is an exercise in the 
theory of second best, As such it involves maximising a 
welfare function subject to the budget constraint, the 
transformation function and the tariff distortions. That 
is a moderately complex system having solutions which will 
not be explicit functions and which will generally be non 
linear. One could try to find the effects of a customs 
union by differentiating the solution equations and solving 
again for the welfare changes. The changes are of uncertain 
sign, 
That, a technocratic procedure, is the recognised 
form for economic maximising since Samuelson's Foundations; 
it does not break open the Customs Union issue. The 
approach itself is questionable since it is available only 
for small tariff changes while the nature of trading 
arrangements often involves substantial movements in tariff 
schedules. An alternative method to be developed here deals 
with some matters which are substantive and others which are 
merely clarificatory, Part II contains a formal analysis of 
the substantial issues - an extension of the number of 
member countries in the customs union and a dissection of 
32. 
the existence of equilibrium. Part I lays down two basic 
re 1 a t ions for a sma 11 cus toms union and in pres en t ing a 
diagrammatic treatment refines several results. 
PART I 
Trade Engel Functions 
For community indifference curves to exist in a 
market demand framework Gorman (6, p.2S) has shown it to be 
necessary and sufficient that (a) at a given price ratio 
different consumers must have paralJel income-consumption 
paths and (b) the income-consumption paths are linear 
functions through the origin of the consumption space. Each 
price "ratio is associated with a specific linear Engel 
function, the same for every individual, j. Thus, where 
<l .• is the demand for good i by consumer j at the relative 1J 
price of good 1, P=P*, we have 
d Oj = kd 1j k>O (1) 
:[ dO' = kI d 1 . 
. J . J J J 
(2) 
where ])., i=O,l is the market demand for good i. As long as 
1 
p=p* good 0 and good 1 are demanded in the proportion k. 
Excess demands are defined as 
F. = D.-S. 
III
i=O,l (3) 
where ~i. is the supply of good i. At p=p* the transformat-
1 
ion fUIlction provides the supply point SO' Si. Select two 
of the demand points on the line given by equation (2) and 
let those points be (D O,D 1), (DO,D]), noticing that they 
hold for p=p* since equation (2) is defined for that price. 
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Fonn a ratio from ions (3) ~t P=P*, using the fixed 
supply po t and selected demand points: 
and substituti 
F F 1 k ( o 0 
:: -----
(4) 
As the excess demands are the amounts tr d, equation (4) 
shows that the quantities traded of two goo ch in the 
proportion k for the domes tit price P*; i.e. e is a 
linear relation 
(5) 
applying for country V under a spe fied pTice rat 
Equation (5) is called a Trade Engel tion s it is 
derived from an Engel function. 
Consumers necessarily comply wi th (1) in 
rence curve models and convex dual erence 
contours will then ensure that the consuillption ratio, k, of 
good 0 to o 1 increases as the relative ce of good 1 
ases, equently k, the gradient in equation (5), 
reases with the domestic relative price. Close rea rs 
of this literature may notice the whimsey in the aggregate 
consumption ratio k: Viner has claimed to have introduced 
community indi rence curves into trade problems; years 
lateT ied a fixed consumption ratio interpretation of 
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his work on customs unions and 0 r wri ters ,s sequently 
examined that situation some us right angled community 
fference curves, Agg te indi renee contours are 
smooth in this paper t e consumption ratios are f d 
for two countries, 
t Constraints 
Multiple tariff s es at home or abroad add a 
degree of complexity to budget constraints which is 
removed by the fol leton derivation. In the 
usual model, countries A and B form a customs union aga st 
C, the res t of world. Member B, in return for export 
ing good 0, imports d 1 from member A and also from the 
rest of the world ~ whi countries A and C are isolated 
from each other, Partner Bis budget constra t conta two 
terms reflecting 
two tariff sche 
and households 
the primit 
disbursement of the revenue am 
es it operates. Since domestic suppliers 
B respond to the local prices of 
of Bis budget constraint is 
c. 
1 
e goo 
(6) 
where P'! 
1 
is the accounting price of good i V and 
t is country V's on imports from S, Terms 
vs 
a FC 0 demands for good 1 rt-F!, < are excess 1 
ing countrl S p ding B with posit tariff revenue. 
Domestic prices are linked ~y countries' tariff schedules 
through ternational trade therefore 
o 
1 ( (7) 
(1 t 
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Country Bls budget constra t now reduces, by way of (3), 
(7) to 
pC 
+ t bc (l+tcb ) p~ F~ ::::: 0 
o 
(8) 
while for countries A and C re ectively it is similarly 
found that budget constra ts are (1) 
(9) 
::::: 0 (10) 
In the next two sections it is shown that a country's budget 
constraint and its Trade Engel function contain the rm-
ation necess to provide its equilibrium position. 
Di rammatic atment 
One of Meade's trade indifference curves, the dom~ 
estic price ratio and the budget line are brought together 
in customary way to provide country A's equil-
ib um F . 1. Country A imports good 0 exports 
good 1, re F~>O, F~<O and the 1 l' point, 
(1) equality of expendi , where 
come i udes the tariff proceeds, 
paDa ~ paDa = paSa + paSa + t 
00' 11 00 11 
a a b 
DOCPO - tabPO) 
Notice (7) that P~ ::: and ubstitute from (7) 
c c 
so t all prices are expressed in terms of PO' PI' Apply 
(3) to obtain (9). Equation (10) has same derivation. 
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E,is in the second quadrant. Line OA is A's budget con-
straint from equation (9) and DE shows the domestic price 
B 
Fig. 1. 
ratio reflecting the tariffs. (2) A trade indifference 
curve is tangent to our domestic price line at E. That 
domestic price ratio implies a particular Trade Engel Fun-
ction, from equation (5), passing through E. One inter-
pretation of point E, the equilibrium position is that it 
is generated by the intersection of the budget line and a 
domestic price line tangential to a trade indifference 
curve. Another useful interpretation of the equilibrium is 
(2) All the budget constraints in the paper are more 
general than the usual budget constraints used in internat-
ional trade. Typically, the effect of other countries 
tariffs are not under consideration which is why other 
writers' budget constraints have a slope equal to the world 
price ratio. Even some other papers on customs unions 
implicitly assume that the rest of the world does not 
impose tariffs on union goods, The rest of the world is 
allowed to impose tariffs in this model so union member's 
budget constr nts have slopes differing from the domestic 
price ratio outside world. 
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that itis the intersection of the budget line (equation 9) 
with BC, the Trade Engel line (equation 5) for the domestic 
price ratio. The second interpretation allows one to dis-
pense with the trade indifference curve and the domestic 
price ratio. 
Country C, representing the rest of the world, is 
like member A in that each imports good 0 from, and exports 
good 1 to, member B. The diagram for C will therefore show 
a second quadrant equilibrium similar to Fig. 1. Member B 
with a pattern of trade such that Fg<O and F~>O, has a 
solution in the fourth quadrant. The diagrams are now used 
to show the effects of a customs union. 
Two proximate causes initiate the consequences of 
union. They are fixed prices, Pg, P~ in the rest of the 
world and reductions in tab' tba when the other tariffs in 
the system, tbc and tcb' are constant. Immutable prices 
p~, P~ in country C keep that country on its initial Trade 
Engel line. CiS budget line is unaffected by variations in 
tab' tba as a glance at equation (10) shows. With no 
changes registered in CiS budget line or in its Trade Engel 
line it follows that equilibrium in the rest of the world 
is unaltered by the formation of a customs union between 
countries A and B, The quantities of goods 0 and 1 whi~h 
C trades are nnchanged and since C trades only with B there 
is no alteration in the amounts which C exports to and 
imports from member B. Weltare levels are thus constant 
in the rest of the world. 
Injecting a world market clearing condition, F~ = 
-F~-F~, into member B's budget constraint - equation (8) 
allows us to write it in a form more convenient for graph-
39. 
ical analysis:-
F~ = - (1+tbc) (l+tCb)P~\y~ + (l+tcb)P~ (tba-tbc)F~ 
(l+tba)P~ (l+tba)P O 
The final term in (11) is the vertical intercept of B's 
c budget equation; Fl , country CiS imports, are constant 
(11) 
throughout as we have seen. The final term may take either 
sign, but when tba is reduced the vertical intercept shifts 
down. The slope of B's budget line is 
< 0 
- (1+tbc ) (1+tcb)P~ 
(1+tba)P~ (12) 
and a reduction in tba makes the slope steeper or more 
negative. B's pattern of trade implies a fourth quadrant 
solution in Fig. 2. 
c 
'\ 
'\ 
B 
Fig. 2 
Prices in the rest of the world are constant and, since 
there are no variations in the tariffs between member Band 
the rest of the world, domestic prices in B are constant 
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too. (3) Member B is confined to its initial Trade Engel 
line AB in Fig. 2. Partner B's budget constraint, equation 
(11), is affected by the union and as tba is reduced the 
vertical intercept has been shown to shift down while the 
slope steepens. C'D' becomes B's budget line after union, 
the equilibrium point changes from EO to El' Member B's 
imports decline and exports exran(l after uLion and El 
involves a lower level of welfare. The deterioration ln 
welfare occurs because the fixed price ratio ensures 
constant domestic supplies of each good; since B's imports 
decline the consumption of the importable therefore 
declines too, and the increased exports occur at the expense 
of local consumption. Later, it will be useful to have 
recalled at this point that CiS exports and imports are 
constant. 
Tariffs between partners A and B do ohange with 
union and because A trades only with B there is variation 
in A's domestic prices. Tariff links between B and the 
rest of the world keep B's domestic prices P~, P~ constant. 
We have, from system (7), 
(13) 
(14) 
For a declin~ng tab and fixed P~ we see that P~ declines; 
a reduced tba for fixed P~ increases P~ Union membership 
for country A therefore raises A's domestic relative price, 
(3) Modified tariffs between the rest of the world 
and the union can easily be incorporated into equations (5), 
(11). It is not usual to do so. 
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P~/P~. Convexity of individuals indifference curves under 
equation (1) increases the gradient k in equations (2), (5) 
for country A as a consequence of the greater relative 
price of good 1. Fig. 3 shows how member A's steeper 
Trade Engel line takes position A'B' . 
c 
Fig. 3 
/ 
/ 
I' B I 
B 
New tariff schedules in the union af ct member A's budget 
constraint as a review of equation (9) indicates. The 
slope there is 
- (1 + tb c) (1 + t c b ) P ~ 
c (1 + t ba) Po 
and the slo~e becomes steeper (more negat 
() (15) 
) as tba is 
reduced. Line C'D' is member A's budget constra t a er 
the union. Equilibrium changes from point EO to El r 
country A after it unites with country B. Curves g 
the way they do necessarily increase the value of F~, part 
ner A's excess demand for imports. What is the movement 
a FI , A's exports? Recall here that count CiS exports of 
good 1 were constant. Since C trades only with B,B's 
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imports of good 1 from C are therefore fixed. IIo\\'cver, B' 5 
total imports of good 1 declined in Fig. 2 implying a fall 
in B's imports of good 1 from A, i.e. A's exports of good I 
declines; El is A's new equilibrium. 
A's welfare increases. 
It is later shown that 
Summarising to here, it has been shown that trade 
with the rest of the world is neither crea+ed nor is it 
diverted - there is an unchanged volume of trade between 
country C and the union. Within the union, trade in the 
export good of the member country isolated from the rest 
of the world shrinks while the quantity traded of that 
country's importable expands. Welfare in the rest of the 
world is unaffected by union, welfare in the isolated 
member improves while the welfare of the partner trading 
inside and outside the union deteriorates. 
PART II 
The Analytics of a Union 
Solving equation (5) for each country with its bud-
get constraint provides a country by country solution pro-
vided world equilibrium exists for an international 
economy containing a small customs union. For country A 
expressions (5), (9) have solution values, 
Fa 
= 
caaapc 
> 0 0 ka+aapc (16) 
·a 
Fa -c < 0 = ---'-I ka apc +a 
(17) 
where aa the real prlce of 
good 1 in country C. The signs are the consequence of the 
pattern of trade. 
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Equations (5), (9) carry a remarkable amount or 
information. The economy is non linear yet for a particul~lr 
price ratio it is described by a linear system. The implic-
it forms of the underlying supply and demand functions have 
been cozened into providing e icit s01utions for the given 
price in (16), (17) something unusual in economics. The 
.t a c solutions are unique, since TaP, a useful property 
when it comes to making weI re comparisons. 
In matching fashion solutions for the rest of the 
world, from (5), (10), are 
> 0 (18) 
> 0 (19) 
c 
where a = (l+t
cb ) and aga the si llow from the world 
trade pattern. 
Solutions for member Bare lable although the 
simplicity of the four previous expressions make it more 
convenient to obtain B's results indirectly through the 
world market clearing conditjons, 
2.:P:' 
v 1 
o 1 0,1 (20) 
together with equations (16)-(19). 
Expressions (16) - (19) allow one to find exac y 
the alterations, brought on by union, in the quantities of 
each good traded by the three countries. Letting primes 
indicate the value of a variable after union and by sub 
a a' 
stituting for a ,a ,equation (16) provides the change 
in member A's imports 
a' a' c 
caP a'--: I --I -c 
k +0. P 
i i C a a c (k a +o.a P ) (k +0. P ) 
(1+tbc ) (l+t cb ) 
( 1 + t b a) (1 + tb a ) 
( a' a) c -c 
+ taca ' (1+ t ba l-k
a
'C"(1+t'ba)·1 
(l+tba ) (l+t~a) 
> 0 
4!J • 
( 21) 
since; (i) all variables are positive ln sign, (ii) (1+tba » 
(l+tba ) by the union agreement and (iii) 
at 
c 
a 
- c >0, 
a' a k c as shown ln the appendix to this Chapter. The inter-
pretation of (21) is that member A's imports expand after 
the union. That result, as do those which follow, holds for 
infinitesimal and for discrete changes in the union's tariff 
structure. 
Inspection of equations (18) and (19), remembering 
that relative price is constant in the rest of the world, 
shows that quantities traded by country C are unaffected by 
the union agreement. 
c' F. 
1 
F~ ::: 0 
1 
1 () , I (22) 
Country B's results follow easily: world market clearing 
requires that the changes in countries excess demands sum 
to zero for each good 
i 0, I (23) 
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Using (21), (22), (23) 
a l a F - F o 0 
> a 
or, member B's exports increase. Turning to B's imports, 
om equation (5) we see that 
b' 
+ c b c 
(25) 
because fixed tari th the rest of the world and con-
stant prices there ensure that B's domestic prices are 
fixed, implying that kb'=kb , cb'::::cb from (5). Relations 
(24) and (25) imply t 
F~' - F~ <0 (26) 
i.e. member B's imports decrease. Final expressions (22), 
(23), (26) show that the change in member A's excess demand 
for its exportable is 
b' b 
·'(F - F ) 1 1 > 
l.e. country A's exports decrease. 
Welfare E cts 
(l C 27) 
Meade's trade indifference curves can be directly 
employed with results obtained on anges in traded 
quantities to show how each country's welfare is affected 
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by the union. His trade indifference contours arc formed 
from the surface 
v=a,b,c (28) 
which is an increasing function of each variable. Sub-
stituting from (22) into (28) provides the welfare effects 
the union has on country C:-
(29) 
= 0 
i,e. the union has no impact on the welfare of the rest of 
the world. The outcome for partner B is 
(30) 
< 0 
since F~Y< F~ < 0, 0 < F~Y< F~ from equations (24), (26). 
Relation (30) shows that the partner trading inside and 
outside the union is worse off as a result of the agreement. 
Similarly for member A 
(31) 
> 0 
a a Y > FaY> a because 0 < FO < FO ; 0 1 FI from relations (21), (27). 
Thus union has the effect of increasing the welfare of the 
member trading only within the union. 
Comparison of Some Results 
Vanek (21) and Kemp (9) have studied the two country 
customs union in the community indifference curve class of 
models presented here. Before moving to the many country 
47. 
union it IS worth noting the refinement that has occurred in 
the results so far obtained r fixed union terms of 
t model. A principal clari cation is in the role of 
in rior goods. As equations (2) and (5) indicate they 
are not present in communi indif renee curve models and 
the results obtained here are ee of the qualificat n rna 
by other investigators. Ana r clarification is on the 
volume of the small union's trade with the rest of the 
world. Vanek (2], p.212) and also Kemp (9. p.31) were 
unable to isolate tra creation from trade diversion 
between the rest of the world and the small union. 
Equations (22) show that the quantities which the outside 
countries exchange wi the union are invariant, trade is 
neither creater nor is it diverted. Vanek's conc ion 
that, !!for the small union of disimilar economies, intra 
unIon trade must expand!! (21,p.212), is contra cted by in-
equalities (21) and (27). Of some significance for the 
theory is the find that the small union has no impact 
whatsoever on the rest of the world. 
Increased Union Membersh 
Scant e rt in the theoretical literature has been 
applied to the customs union of more than two members. Two 
member customs unions do exist in the real world though 
multiple me~bership is more common. The analysis can be 
extended to un of three or more members in a direct 
manner if world equilibrium exists, a problem postponed 
until the next section. It is trivial to multiply the 
number unit cells consisting of countries like A and B 
above. There would be no trading relations between cells 
and such an a ement could scarcely be alled a customs 
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union even though a common tariff schedule could apply to 
all cells. What does constitute a meaningful eitension to 
the number of members of a trading arrangement is the intro-
duction of a further member AI' which, like member A draws 
good 0 from member B and not from the rest of the world. 
That 1S a three member customs union. Evidently a multi-
country customs union consisting of countries AI' A2 , ... An' 
B is possible, each country Aj trading only with B while B 
trades inside and outside the union. 
Members Aj have the budget constraints given by 
equation (9) and equation (10) is the unchanged budget 
constraint for C, the rest of the world. The system for the 
world as a whole containing the world market clearing 
conditions, reflecting the inherent linear dependencies 
(further analysed below)is 
FI+a 
pC 
FI I = 0 
0 pC I 
0 
FI_kIFI I = c 
o I 
= 0 
4~. 
pn 
-
knpn 
0 1 
c 
pc + a 
Pl FC 0 cpc 1 
0 
o 
pc 
1 
1 
+ 0 pb + pn + 0 0 . , . + 0 0 0 o 
0 pI + o + Fb + 0 + + 0 + FC 1 1 1 1 "" 0 
(32) 
where excess demands for members A1 ,A 2 ,···An are 
respectively 1 2 F~ i 0, 1; b F C F. , F i' " " .. ,. F. , i=O,l are 1 1 1 i' 
respective excess demands in member B and in the rest of 
) 
the world; a j = (l+tbj ) 
a 
c 
Permuting columns provides the generalised 
solution to the world system (32) r the members A. and 
J 
country C, i.e. 
j=1,2, , .• , n,c ( 33) 
Partner B's solution is available from (32) but it is more 
easily obta d through the world market clearing con-
ditions and the equilibrium quantities for all other 
countries. Identical operations as were applied to equat-
ions (20) - (31) r the two member union yield the same 
r 
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the same conclusions. I-lence the welrare ~1ild volume of trade 
results in the previous sections generalise to the union 
of artibrary size. 
Existence of Equilibrium 
An invalid assumption IS contained in the literature 
on the small customs union. The presumpticn that an equil-
ibrium solution generally exists for the community indiff-
erence curve model of the small union is not justified. 
Passing mention was made in the previous section of the 
inherent linear dependencies; these are now examined. The 
argument to be used applies to the many member union tllOII,lJ,h 
to relieve the notational burden only the two country union 
will be treated. Walras' Law and market clearing require-
ments assure that there is a linear dependence between the 
budget constraints and the conditions for world equilibrium 
in each market. One of the countries' budget constraint is 
therefore eliminated from the system of equations which 
C Pi IV becomes~ where a· = J 
pa a + aaPl 1 
Fa 
0 
ka ,:1 
1 
FC + 0 
FC 0 
: -
:::: 0 
a 
"" c 
a pC 
"" 
0 
C 1 
kCpc C 
'" C 1 
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Fb kbFb b c 0 1 
Fa + FC b 0 0 0 + FO 
Fa +F c + Fh ~ 0 1 1 1 
(34) 
after B's budget constraint has been eliminated and the 
world market clearing conditions included. Now the rank 
of the matrix formed from the coefficients on the left of 
system (34) is 6 because in general a non zero 6x6 deter-
minant can be formed from that matrix. An augmented matrix 
formed by supplementing the left hand side coefficients 
with the vector of constants in (34) has a rank of 7, 
since the 7x7 determinant formed from the augmented matrix 
takes the value 
(35) 
in general. Thus, because the rank of the augmenterl matrix 
exceeds the rank of the matrix of coefficients in system 
(34) a solution, in general, does not exist (7,p.169). 
Further restrictions must be placed on t~e system to 
guarantee the existence of a solution to the small country 
customs union problem. One such restriction from (35) 
. abc v 
IS k =k =k and *c =0, a requirement that is not equiv-
alent to identical income-consumption paths betweeen 
countries. 
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A resolution of the paradoxical conclusion of the 
non existence of equilibrium 
union is required, the more so 5 
the existence of equilibrium 
customs unions, What Shaven 
each country exist such that 
the case of a small country 
ce Shaven (19) has proved 
the most general class of 
d is that price vectors for 
world system attains a full 
equilibrium and so does aa count A change in one or more 
of Shaven's parameters results a new set of equilibrium 
price vectors which is di rent ln general from the initial 
equilibrium price vectors, This is the feature that has 
been picked up in the above analysis. By altering their 
tariffs union members tiate parameter changes in the 
general equilibrium tem and, as is well known, new price 
vectors in eve c ly emerge. That is the sense 
in which the small customs union does not exist. However, 
such a non-existent small customs union is really a red herr-
ing because one may com rtably redefine the small customs 
union to be one caus no appreciable price variation 
the rest of the world. The price changes in the rest of 
the world, stemming from the formation of a small customs 
union, are to be imperceptible, 
53. 
APPENDIX TO CHAPTER 2 
(i) a' a c -c > 0 
Equation (5) gives member A's Trade Engel Function: 
Substituting from relation (3) 
(Al) 
by using equation (2) 
a kaS~ Sa c = - 0 
pa pa 
= 
kaSa C_1_) saC-.l) 1 pa o pa 
0 0 
a' pa pa a' 
a' a ' PI P 
c -c 
'" 
ka Sa C-,) kaSa C-1) + sa C-1.) SaC_l_) 1 pa 1 pa o pa o a' 
0 0 0 Po 
> 0 
(A 2) 
since from the discussion around equations (13), (14) the 
I 
relative price of good (1) increases so that (a) k a >k a 
from the convexity of individuals indifference curves under 
equation (1), (b) 
from the concavlty of the transformation function. 
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( i i V VI VI V k c > k c 
The linear Trade Engel Functions, (5), have different 
slopes for different domestic prices. Take the equations 
for two Trade Engel Functions and solve, ~~ being the 
1 
solution values for count V 
pV 
o 
pV 
1 
o 
VI 
::: C 
o from (A2) 
substitute 11 l' c' am (Al) into (A4) 
from 
~v = 
a 
< 0 
irements (a), (b) In the discuss 
(AS) (A4) imply 
I V V Vi 
C ~ k c < 0 
(A3) 
(A4 ) 
1. g 
) 
( ) 
2). 
(1\6) 
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CHAPTER III 
THE MANY GOOD CUSTOMS UNION 
Much of the formal work in customs union theory has 
been confined to the study of the two commodity world (Vanek 
(21), Kemp (9)) partly because complementarity between goods 
does not arise to provide difficulties and partly because 
there is a unique pattern of (free) trade in the three 
country - two good statement of the customs union problem. 
Difficulties associated with more complex schedules of 
tariffs are avoided in the two good case. Such problems 
indicate that the departure from the two good model to the 
three or more good model is a long step and it is one that 
has been taken by significant researches in the field, the 
work by Lipsey (12) and the study of Meade's (15), both 
undertaken In the 1950's and Corden's unpublished recent 
work. Unqualified results were not obtained by the work of 
those theorists and many of their conclusions had to be 
stated in the form that: a particular conclusion holds 
provided the volume of trade expands - however, if trade 
does not expand then another conclusion holds, The prob-
lem's intracability forced other statements of the form: 
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it is more likely that (00 ••• ) 0 An approach which pins down 
the directional movement of the trade volume as an integral 
part of the three good customs union model seems essential 
to further progress in the area. Such an approach is 
developed here and, in fact, it will turn out that welfare 
effects can be fully determined by comparing equilibria, as 
can changes in trade volumes - references to which become 
superfluous in the statements on countries' welfare. A 
second line of development is to extend the number of goods, 
beyond the three examined by Lipsey, while preserving 
resultso 
A Many Good Custo~s Union 
In Lipsey's problem (12 p.32) it was necessary to 
restrict both the pattern of production and the pattern of 
tradeo The situation was that countries A and B, the union 
members, were specialized in production to the extent that 
each manufactured its export good, and only its export good, 
so that each could export just one commodity. We will relax 
those assumptions, allowing them as a special case, although 
the "small union" assumption of constant prices outside the 
union will be retained. The pattern of trade to be invest~ 
igated is: 
o 
Fig. 1 
where C indicates 
57, 
rest of the world and the arrows indic-
ate the directions in which goo 0,1.2,3 are flowing between 
countries. A four good world is esented which can be 
reduced to the dimensions of L s 's problem by restricting 
the supplies of and the I' good 3 to be identically 
zero in every country. e scussion will be in terms of 
the excess demands for o orne supplies may be set at 
zero to obtain the production pattern I' the Lipsey problem, 
APe Curves 
It has been long known (Arrow & Hahn (2) pp 220,221) 
& Gorman (6)) that individuals must have iden cal Linear 
Engel lines at each price vector if communi indif rence 
curves are to exist and that el 1 s must pass 
through the origin. That requirement imposes a condition 
on the Trade Indifference Curves, C 1) overlooked in the 
C 1) In the two good case, where d .. 1J 
ption of good i at price ratio p=p*; d .=kd.l .· oJ .. J 
Engel line through the origin. Therefore, Ed
oj 
the relationship between market demands at P=p* 
jls consum-
or Do=kDl' is 
to be the 
same for all individuals, P=P* provides a unique point (S~, on the 
transformation frontier, Let the excess demands 
ect two points (Do,D1) and D~,Di) on the 
having slope Ie With price p* the excess demands 
first point on the Engel line are Fo=Do and 
demands corresnonding to the second point on the 
P-'=D'" -S* and V=D~ -S* thus 
00000 
CD -S*)-(D'" -S*) 
o 0 0 0 
CD -S ~ - CD-- -S*) 1 1 1 1 
excess 
k 
Or, for p=p* excess demands change in the constant ratio, k, a 
function - the Trade Engel line. 
international t 
58. 
literature, and which is useful in the 
solution to Lipsey's problem. In the two good situation 
the 1 inea r Engel curve requi remen t carri es through the i !leI i vi d-
U:l I s I and the communi i f renee curves over to the 
trade indifference curves; because, at given domestic prices 
the production point on e transformation function is 
fixed, so that the same ratio e sts between excess demands 
as exists between the consumptions of the goods for the 
given d6mestic prices. For a g domestic price ratio, 
individual utility functions, all community indi erence 
curves and all the trade indif renee curves have the same 
slope and the points of common slope in each set of indiff-
erence functions are colinear, on lines all with the common 
slope k (2) 
Hence F =kF for p=p* so that po 
a 
for different trade indifference curves 1 
line with a positive gradient. And, from 
the individuals! indifference curves a re 
s of equal slope 
on a straight 
convexity of 
tion in the 
relative domestic price of one good increases the consumpt-
ion ratio of that good to the other; k then increases r 
the three types of indifference maps, (3) including the 
trade indifference curves. This effect of a domestic price 
change shows what happens to the ratio of the quantities of 
goods traded, the information being disclosed by the be re 
and ter points in the trade indifference map, and although 
it hoI for the two good case alone, it will emerge to be 
If answer to the Lipsey problem. 
( ?) S /1) ,- ,cc note l 
( ;)) L ar Engel curves preclude the inferiori case. 
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Budget Constraint 
Expenditure on the four goods at domestic prices in 
country A is PoaDoa + P1aD1a + PZaD Za + P3aD3a , where Drs' 
P are respectively the demand for and the domestic account-
rs 
lng price of good r in country s, and this must equal income 
in the budget constraint. Income consists of the domestic 
value of output and the proceeds from the +ariffs i.e. 
P S +P S +P S +P S +t P CD -S )+t P CD -S ) 
oa oa la 1a 2a 2a 3a 33 1a 1b 1a 1a Za 2c 2a Za 
where t. is country A's tariff on the imports of good i. la 
Under the assumed pattern of trade country A's sources of 
imports are country B for good 1, and the rest of the world 
for good 2. Prices l)etween countries are linked by the tar-
iff schedules so that 
and we assume that good 3 is a free trade good though tar~ 
iffs on good 3 ln no way affect the conclusions. A referral 
to the pattern of trade shows that Poa,P1b,PZc,P3a' among 
others are constants from the small union assumption. Equat-
ing expenditure with income and substituting from the tariff 
links provides the budget constraint for country A in terms 
of domestic prices: 
P 
P F + C 1a)F + 
oa oa l+t 1a 
la 
PZa ( )F + 
l+t Za 
Za 
where F. is the excess demand for good i in country A. la 
Implementing their customs union agreement, countrles 
A, B reduce or eliminate their tariffs on each other's goods 
maintaining tariffs against the rest of the world which is 
therefore discriminated against. Reconsidering A's budget 
constraint, and also the pattern of trade, it is seen that 
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P ,P, and P3 arc unchanged since the rest of the world is oa ",a a 
price setter, tZa is constant under the union agreement 
while t ia falls and so does PIa' from the tariff links; 
Ib'PZc are fixed by coun C). In all~one domestic 
ice and one tariff rate change in partner A's budget 
constraint; the other domestic prices are constant. It is 
t constancy of those price that contains the se half 
of the answer to Lipsey's problem. 
the Tariff Distortion 
The great problem the previous analyses of e 
three or more good union s been the rapidly increasing 
complexities introduc by pairwise complementa ty and 
subsitutabily between o Without making arbitary 
assumptions on the campI -substitution relation it has 
of course not been sible to impose a priori restrictions 
on the directions in which the demand curve for one good 
shifts when a tax or tariff is imposed on ana r good. In-
vestigators have thus been forced into a taxonomy of cases 
if they wished to avoid arbitrary assumptions on inter-
related goods. General results have then not been obtained. 
But it will be shown how the many ood~mall-country 
union can be reduced to a two dimensional problem the 
commod~ty space. availability of this re tion has the 
valuable conspquence of eliminating the need r the arbit-
rary assumptions on which pairs of goods are stitutes and 
which pairs are complements. The problem of assigning 
directions to shi s in demand functions 110wing the 
tax changes, it turns out, then disappears. The disappear-
ance of this problem follows for the reason tha the many 
good problem can be collapsed to a two good p lem and that 
the substitution effect is alw negative the two 
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good case. Income effects do not upset that sign because all 
Engel cuyves aye linear, the need foy assumptions on 
pairwise yelations between goo is eliminated and more 
general results should be obta ed. 
When the prices of a group of ~oods are constant 
relative to each othey those goods may be aggregated and 
tyeated as a single commodi ,as Hicks (Value and Capital -
Appendix) and later Samuelson (18, pp 141 11~) have shown. 
Jones (8) and Be las (3) have recently used the composite 
goods theoyem ln eynational trade pyoblems, Jones on the 
supply side and Beyglas on excess demands. The constant 
domestic pYice condi on is met foy goods 0,2,3 in country A 
and fyom that point of ew they can be foymed into a com 
posite commodity. Howevey, theye are the distoytion teyms 
1 
and 1 +t 1a 
must be pyoved 
when the tayi 
1 pyesent in the budget constyaint and it 
2a 
t the composite goods theorem still holds 
stoytions exist. The pYoof undey tariff 
distoytions n good case ap!)ears in the appendix to 
this chapteY, It is there that the transformation matrices 
operating on ice vector and on the excess demand vector 
to provide the composite good's excess demand under 
tariff are g By those transfoymations the excess 
demand for composite good, defined ovey the goo 
with co· stant domestic prices, is 
a 
P F 
oa oa 
+ F +P F 2a oa 3a 
0, ,3 
so that the composite excess demand is thyee of e terms 
the bu et consty nt and the budget constra t becomes 
F 
oa 
+ 
PIa 
I+t Ia 
having substituted for PIa l+t Ia 
F 
oa 
o 
from the tariff equations, 
The slope of the budget constraint is 
1 
< 0 
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which is a constant, because of the pattern of trade and the 
small union assumption, and is unaffected by the re-negot~ 
iated tariff schedules, Commodity 1 has a domestic price in 
country A of PIa and 
< 1 
[\ 1 :-; 0 :; 1 n co e , 1 
PIa 
is the relative domestic price of the 
composite good in terms of good 1 the domestic price line 
always has a lesser absolute slope than does the budget 
constraint. Individual's utility functions, community 
indifference curves and the trade and indifference curves 
have a common slope equal to the domestic price ratio, a 
slope less negative than the slope of the budget constraint 
so that equilibrium in the trade indifference curve diagram 
1S given by Toint E, in fig, 2 
The broken line through E is the domestic price ratio 
cutting a budget line (written as a function of the composite 
excess demand) and the domestic price line is tangent to Uo -
a trade indifference curve also expressed in terms of the 
excess demand~4) 
F 
oa 
The So 
From 
it is seen t 
,F I ] a a 
Fig, 2 
tariff equation 
reduction in tariffs under 
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customs 
union a ement leaves Vib unaltered while PIa 115 as t 1a 
is re the slope of the budget line in Fig. 2 
ant, at I while the slope of s con --, 
V1b 
price line, 1 becomes steeper but rema 
b t line. Lastly, recall h~j t 
(4) It s been shown by Samuelson 
and it is shown in the appendix for the L s 
laws of demand continue to hold when the utili 
conta composite good as a variable. 
e domestic 
les ste 
pp 141-143 
t 
tions 
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a reduction in the domestic prIce of od 1 necessarily in 
creases the ratio of the quantity traded of good 1 to the 
quantity traded of the composite good(Sl i.e. k'>k. The 
new equilibrium is given by E~ in Fig, 3 
U 
o 
Fig. 3 
F la 
At point E", in comparison to point E, the domestic price 
line has become steeper and the relative quantity of good 1 
traded has reased. The solution, then, to Lipsey1s 
problem is that the customs union unambiguously raises the 
welfare of country A since E" is on Ul an i ifference 
curve preferred to U. Furthermore. the quantity of good 
o 
1 imported and the amount of the composite good exported 
(5) By solving the equations for any pair of Trade 
Engel lines it can be shown that they necessarily intersect 
in the third qu ant, see the append to the previous 
chapter. 
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necessarily increase. Union partner B is symmetrical with 
country A, so B's welfare also increases(6)etc. There is a 
definite creation of trade wi in the union because member A 
imports good 1 only from member B and A's imports of that 
good increase; similarly B's imports of good 0 from A expand. 
Lipsey (12) generalised his problem to its broadest 
conception in his appendices to Chapters Five and Six; he 
was there concerned with second best problem of finding 
the optimum distortion to be placed on imports from the 
partner given that other tariff distortions are to re-
main. As an exercise in the theory of second best is tas k 
has a ready resolution in Fig. 3. Given the budget const-
raint. the highest tra indifferences curve attainable is 
the one. not drawn, which is tangent to the budget line at 
say, point E", ency at that second best optimum re 
the budget line have same quires the domestic price line :mc! 
slope; only when t =0 does _ ._1_ = 
la PIa 
1 
so that the 
la 
second best optimum level of tariffs requires that country 
A eliminates the tari on its partner's goods, 
ious Results 
Meade is acknowledged by Lipsey (11 p. ) to have 
obtained results similar to those which Lipsey ved. A 
revision of Meade's results, results which are at the core 
of the theor the many good customs union, is now nec-
essary. lier work suggested that; 
"I. A rtia1 customs union which only reduces tarif on 
some imports is more likely to se weI than is a 
(6) See Lipsey (11 pp. 32-33) 
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complete union which removes tariffs from some imports. 
2. A customs union is more likely to raise welfare the 
higher is the level of tariffs which are reduced or 
removed in relation to the tariffs which are unch edit. 
(Lipsey (11) p. 38) 
From the argument buttressi Fig. 3 on the second best 
optimum level of tariffs results 1,2 are se~n not to be the 
case, A union which el n tes internal tariffs ieves the 
second best optimum, can to 1 above. Then, too, a tar-
iff reduction within the un n raises a member's welfare re-
g less of the initial (positive) level of tariffs in dis 
tinction from 2 above. Given a uniform tariff schedule prior 
to union there are two other results in the core of thea 
and need of re-examination, as they are stronger than 
Lips claimed; 
113. A necessary condition for a cus toms union to 
crease welfare is that it results in a decrease 
in purchases of domestic goo so that the volume 
of imports (measured in the constant international 
prices) increases". (Lipsey (11) p, 38) 
For the case Lipsey studied, (complete specialisation In the 
production of the export good), 3 is bo necessary and suff 
icient - not merely a necessary condition as will be seen 
by the canst tion of a diagram wi communi indifference 
curves and a transformation curve consist of a point on 
the axis for export good~ It is stro er than claimed in 
the further sense that it does not require an initially uni-
form tariff. But the result does not apply when one departs 
from the assumpt of specialised pro tion, 
One of L s 's results requires review 
il4. A u i 1 (but not necessa ) con t on r a 
customs union to ralse welfare is that it should 
result in an increase in the quantity purchased of 
all imp 0 r t s . n ( Lips e y (11) p. 38) 
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From Fig. 3 one sees that result 4 has been modified and 
substantially strengthened. The condition on all imports is 
unduly restrictive since no more is required than an increase 
in imports from the partner country; import~ from the rest of 
the world, contained within the excess demand for the com-
posite good, may move in either direction while welfare still 
increases. Movement outwards along the budget line from 
point E is sufficient to increase welfare, and necessarily 
occurs, bringing with it an expansion of the imports of good 
1 from the partner. Thus the expansion of imports from the 
partner between the equilibrium points is a necessary and 
sufficient condition for a welfare improvement in the customs 
union. The restated condition does not require the initial 
uniformity of tariffs nor does it need specialised production 
and it becomes a stronger conclusion than Lipsey claimed. 
The overview of the LinseY-Meade results is that, they 
did not make a prediction on welfare since the work from 
which they drew their conclusions did not determine whether 
the various conditions would hold or would not hold e,g. 
"If a customs union is found in which the volume of 
international trade does not increase (assuming that 
international prices remain unchanged) it can be 
asserted that welfare cannot have increased. 
"If,on the other hand, a customs union is found which 
causes an increase in the volume of trade in all 
commodities, it can be asserted that the union has 
caused an increase in welfare (again assuming that 
international prices do not change) ," (Lipsey (11)p.40). 
68. 
An application of the composite good theorem has now elim-
inated the "either better or worse off" nature of the wel'-
fare conclusion and extended it beyond the three-good-
specialised-production-union-member situation. The result 
is now that in the generalized model of the Lipsey problem 
both partners gain as a result of the mutual tariff reduct-
ion arising from the union agreement and t~at trade expands 
between them. 
Corden (7) working wi th ~I di U"erent trade flow than 
Lipsey, allows for changes in t]lC pattern of imports as a 
result of union and he calls this variation in goods flow 
the import pattern effect. Corden finds that there are 
cases where the import pattern effect raises welfare. A 
type of import pattern effect which increases welfare can 
also occur in the present model in that a union member's 
imports of good 2 may fall to zero. 
Finally, within the model, there is the kernel of 
a suggestion that the small customs unions of Africa, 
Australasia, the Carribean and Latin America should consider 
eliminating tariff between member states. 
Appendix - over 
(7) ~orden, W.M. The Effects of Customs Unions ln 
a Multi-Commodity Model, unpublished mimeo. 
AFPENDIX 
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The Composi te Gooe. Under Dis tort ions 
In deriving the transformations defining the 
composite good Samuelson shows first that the pure sub-
stitution effect is negative in the absence of the composite 
good, (18 pp. 107-]08) and second that after applying two 
transformations defining the composite good the pure sub-
stitution effect remains negative, (18 pp. 141143), Thus, 
given the conditions necessa::y for the transformations to 
hold,a sub group of commodities can be amalgamated in a 
speciE.l manner and treat(~d as a single commodi ty for which 
the pure substitution ef:~ect is negative. A parallel pro 
cedure is set out here to show first that in the presence 
of price distortions the pure substitution effect is neg-
ative, and second that a::ter applying two transformations 
under the distortions defining the composite good, the pure 
substitution effect remains negative. The heurstic treat-
ment prccccds the formal proof: 
In the heuristic treatment two considerations are 
prese~ted by the existence of community indifference curves 
in the model and by the tariff distorted budget constraint, 
PoFo • (PI /1+tl)F 1 + (P Z /l+t Z) F2 + P3F3 = O. The first 
consideration is that at a given domestic price ratio the 
community indifference curve has the same slope as has each 
individual's indi fference curve at that pri ce ra tio 1. e. the 
community indif renee curve has a slope equal to that 
domestic price ratio. T};e second consideration is that at 
the same time as the community indifference curve takes 
that price slope it also meets the distorted budget con-
straint. In two of the dimensions the equilibrium is 
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shown, in Fig. A1, at point A. 
Fig. A1 
Fig. A2 
The broken lilLe through A is the domestic price line. the 
solid line through A is the tariff distorted budget con-
straint. Constraining the economy to U , by varying the 
o 
budget line, when the domestic price ratio increases, res-
ults in point B and so the negative pure substitution effect 
under the tariff distortion. 
At the beginning of the formal proof it is remembered 
that given the existence of community indifference curves 
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Income redistributions, at constant domestic prices, hetwecn 
individuals do not alter a r ate behaviour; thus as is 
usual. we proceed to use the community indifference curves 
in exactly the same way as Samuelson (Founda ons Harvard 
University Press, 1965 p,108) used the individual's 
indifference curves to obtain pure substitution effect 
for the individual, Intro the disto;tion provides 
the pure substitution ef ct with the tariff. Let the 
budget constraint under distor ons be 
pax = Y 
where p is the row vector of domestic prices, a is the 
positive diagonal matrix (a i ) + . 
1 
of tariff distortions 
and x is the column vector of consumptions, The community 
nimises the expenditure to achieve a welfare level Uex) 
U
o 
to which it will be constra d. Consider two dom-
estic price vectors pO,p~ and their associated cost minim 
ising consumption vectors, respect o x , x. Then since 
UC 
& 
) = U(x~) = U and cost is min 
o 
< P ~ 0 aX 
< pOax~ 
(xo-x~) ~ 0 
o 
sed 
yield the generalised Dure substitution orem when 
there is a tari distortion. When there are no tariff 
(1) 
distort ns a· 
1 
1 V i and the usual result is obtained from 
(1), Allow g the price of just one good n to ange 
provi s 
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(Xn IIp;nD.xn < 0 o (2) 
and so the resul t that the own price pure substitution effect 
is negative for the whole economy in the presence of tariffs. 
The next problem is to show that inequalities (1), (2) hold 
a r a transformation has been applied to goods vector, 
This transformation will define composite good, The 
transforma on under tariff stortions is one of an 
inity of suitable transformations, as Samuelson (18 
p,124n) has observed, 
distortion associated 
-a P 
r r 
1 
o 
o 
a P 
o 0 
o 
Defining, for a.> 0 the tariff 
1 
th Pi' transformed vector 
000 o l 
1 
1 
1 
o 
o 
a P 
r r 
introducing 
-
X :;: 
r 
1: [j, 
i 
x 
n 
i 
trans 
etzP z 
0 1 
0 1 
o 
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rmed goods vec r , 
- - 0 x 
0 
xl 
1 
1 
it is seen that P X :;: etPX Y or, the economy remains on its 
budget constraint er the transformations, Let UeX) u 
o 
and let X; XO be the expenditure minimising consumption quant 
ities associat respectively with ~; Then as before. 
& 
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which is the result obtained in inequality (1). Allowing 
just the price of good n to vary, as before, relation (1~) 
yields 
PA)(X"_ ) 1 - 1 
a 
0 
0 
a P -a 
"" 
'11 [p~ p;] [x~ 
CI l\P l\X 
n n n 
< 0 
n n n 
0-1 
t 
i 
a > 0 
n 
n-1 
CL E a.Po X: 1 
-i 1 1 
X 
x XO n 1 n 
XO X'" -n n 
The term in (2") is exactly the term obtained in (2) so that 
the pure own price substitution effect with a tari dist-
art ion may be obtained from the trans rmations de ning P, X. 
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IV 
A GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM MODEL OF 
TRADING ARRANGEMENTS 
GAINS FROM 
National Income Analysis Walrasian Economics 
The entire body of macroeconomics cl1ses on the 
determination of, and changes national income; the 
implicit rationale for the focus is t it is an economic 
variable of particular interest. ( 1] G ry, much of 
it directed to growth rates orne per i similarly 
oriented, 
Macro magnitudes such as tot itures on the 
demand side and output on the supply s as well homo 
ous f ial assets, are used 0 te nati 
family of models stemming from Hi IS analysis. 
~unal equivalence of the t 
of national product and the factor Income o to 
nation income is commonplace. 
[1] problems of national income as a measure of weI re 
are treated in Samuelson, P,A., "Evaluation of a.l 
National Income", published in "Read gs in lfare 
Economics", ? K.J., & Scitovsky T, ed Irw 
Homewood 1969, p.402-433. 
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An idea, central to this chapter, involves 10-
itation of this commonplace concept. The equality of the 
d goods and factor payment definitions of national 
income will be used to lop a model of the 
s from trade. Later, model will be appl in 
measuring the changes in ome from different t 
situatio~s; in particular, measuring the income gains 
from the many forms of trading arrangements to which a 
country may enter. 
Simple excess demand type macro models of National 
Income are scarcely cast forms useful estimation and 
the estimation of simultaneously determined macro variables 
lves, in practice, considerable departures the con-
ts of, say, the LM IS model. On some the depart-
ures are seen as steps towards realism. The sent con-
struct also departs from the aggregative mo Is in that it 
accumulates the national ome variable the micro-
economic markets. It uses the factor definition of 
national income. From the many markets labour, 
entrepreneurs' act ities and other tors's ces , it 
arrives at national factor income, , national income 
is a macro magnitude which in this chapter, is determined 
from its general equilibrium, micro-economic, factor market 
components. 
s From Trade 
Domestic National Income is as 
(1) 
where w. is 
1 
price of one year's serv e of factor i 
V. is the quantity of that domestic input supplied in the 
l 
same year. Equilibrium in national income is established 
when each market in the economy is in equilibrium. Let w 
be the vector of relative domestic factor prices, P be the 
d . l' . t f h d d Vd VS omestlc re_atlve prlce vec or or at er goo s an , 
be the vectors of domestic factor demands and supplies. The 
general equilibrium vector factor demand and supply functions 
in the absence of distortiuns are then 
s V 
and the equilibrium conditions in the economy require 
(2) 
(3) 
The equilibrium values of P, and of w, are determined 
in the Walrasian system for the economy as a whole, not from 
(2) alone. Confining the definition of P and of w to the 
equilibrium goods price and factor price vectors respect-
ively, substitution of P, w into an equation in (2) provides 
V. Thus, the equilibrium value of real domestic national 
factor income, Y, is available; 
Y = w V (4) 
Prior to trade, the equilibrium goods price vector In 
a country differs from the world price vector, otherwise 
trade woul~ not subsequently occur. World prices of traded 
goods (except for transport costs and the effects of pro-
tection) rule in the country after trade is established. 
Equilibrium national income therefore takes a pre-trade 
value which is in general different from its post trade 
value. Where the superscript no" indicates the pre-trade 
equilibrium value of a variable and the absence of a s er-
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scr t indicates its post tr value, a general equilib ium 
measure of the INCOME GAINS FROM TRADE is 
o y - y ::::: wV 
which may take either 
°Vo - w 
51 This measure of the gains 
losses in income from t 15 t in the sense 
1 whether markets are pe ct or imperfect, whether 
ere s e trade or n re is protection; it 
to countries which are 1 relation to the rest of 
world 0 insignificant in the wo d economy, and the 
ition remains valid in disequilibrium, 
(5) 
0 
1 
lie 
A country is small ernational trade when the 
quantities of its exported and imported goods are so small 
as to no effect on the world prices of these goods. 
That is to say it lS a pe ct ernational competito . 
s it is faced with an 
ed on d markets, if it lS 
momentarily ~ssuming it to be and if 
The small country assumption is use 
because equations (2) become 
vd "' Vd(w,P) 
VS(w,P) 
P P which is determin 
e trade economy we are 
1 ods are t d, 
in the present problem 
(6) 
National ome itself can then be eva ed the w 
V cont d .1.n solution va 5 to va les in (6). 
System (6) conta parameters P 1 solution values 
for vari les (6) will be tions of P Le, 
w w(P) 
and (7) 
V yep) 
Equilibr nation income is there 
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y :: w(P)V(P) (8) 
An alternative interpretation may be placed on the 
equilibrium outcome of (6) I an interpretation which relaxes 
the assumption of no non-traded goods. The vector, w, con-
tains prices which are not determined on world markets and 
until now w, V have been defined as the factor price and 
domestic factors quantity vectors, Extending the definition 
of w to include all the prices of goods which are determined 
ln the country's own markets, and not on world markets, 
allows one to introduce the general category of non-traded 
goods to the model, With such redefinitions of wand an 
appropriate definition of V one does not use the inner pro-
duct, wV, as the national income; a summation restricted to 
factors is used instead. Some factor prices may be inter-
nationally determined, such as capital's rental, and will 
enter P in which case two summations are required. 
Trading Arrangements and a Micro Analysis of 
National Income 
Equations (6) are capable of econometric estimation 
for a given country, provided they can be identified. 
Once such estimates are completed the equilibrium values of 
w, V may be predicted from the reduced form of the estimat-
ed model - for a particular set of the pre-determined 
variables, p, Forecasts of national factor income, again 
for certain P, should then be available using the definition 
(8) , 
These fo ecasting techniques can be applied to the 
evaluation of a trading arrangement by using the relation 
between world and local prices after tariffs. When any 
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country, large or small in relation to the rest of the worlJ, 
\. 
imposes tariffs the domestic price vector, P, becomes 
'}; 
P == (I + t)P ( ~1) 
where (I + t) 1S the diagonal matrix of tariff rates, each 
~, 
tariff being positive, negative or zero and P 1S now the 
world C.I.F, price vector, Substituting (9) into a set of 
equations describing the entire economy will yield w, V and 
eventually the tariff ridden level national income, Tariffs 
levied by a small country do not affect world prices which 
o * _ 
remain at P = P. Using (9), wand V, the domestic national 
income may be determined for a small country from 
(10) 
and Y :: W V 
Equations (10); or more properly, forecasts from (10), 
permit a quantifiable income comparison of two tariff 
vectors, t and t f at a particular point 1n time, for a given 
p, Letting primes indicate the equilibrium values of 
variables under the new tariff regimen and when the initial 
equilibrium values of variables are without primes, the 
change in national income attributable to a new level of 
tariffs in a (~mall country is, using (8), (9), 
Y' - Y '" w[ (I+t')iJ]V[ (I+t')Pl-w[ (I+t)P]V[ (I+t)P] (11) 
and equation (11) provides ~ quantifiable answer to the 
higher or lower tariffs issue in particular cases, 
Elements (1 + t.) of the tariff matrix may be treat-
1 
ed as exogenous variables, if government imposes tariffs for 
reasons outside the system, or as endogenous variables; 
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(1 + t.) will be an 
1 
genous variable if that tariff 1 
levied in order, say, to prate t wa Equations for 
tariff formation become s lements to system (10) 
in the dependence case, s themselves are then 
endogenous vari les p lem, 
Many k of a an t between small 
countries involve or losses t t can be measured and 
evaluated as special cases of (11), r example, a uni-
lateral movement to e tya would imply t' 0; or? a 
tariff preference to a particular country modifies the 
tariff matrix in a way ecified by an tel' country agree-
ment, A FREE TRADE AREA invo s exact such an agreement, 
Equations (9) and (11) can thus form ba is l' a proced-
ure to estimate the change e national income 
consequent upon the Free Trade reement between tralia 
and NelA! Zealand. 
Equation (11) is e renc en two r 
products or two summations. Each term one of sums is 
orne of a factor, so by disaggregat (11) 
come ge may be obtained factor by iation 
distribution of income, a conse o a new 
arrangement, thereby became available ere t 
rent tors have in some tariff matrices over a 
tari matrices is revealed. The estimation method, used 
below, 11 go still deeper to reveal factor income by 
try. One factor in an industry, in prine Ie, 
pre r a dif rent tariff matrix to another tor 
same industry. 
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The Pseudo Optimum iff 
Since tari es alter national income in 
manner shown it is a natural extension of the method to 
enquire which set of tari 
That set of tarif is c 
maximise national income. 
led pseudo-optimum tari to 
distinguish it from the Paretian 
tariff, The literature on 
cept of the optimum 
imum tariff shows how the 
government of a count 
may manipulate world 
in a Paretian sense, 
VJ t11 ly powe on world marke s 
's advantage, 
policy. A small 
prices to 
its tart 
country,not having monopOly power, a Paretian optimum 
tariff vector of zero i,e. on 
e trade, 
tian gr s it chases 
National income max sation 
fferent criteria and the Paretian opt 
Paretian optima are 
tarl vector of 
zero for the small country does not necessa i 
national income. For example in 
small country may succeed in increas 
tor cost (through the Stolper-Samuelson 
a tari The removal of tari 
providing a Paretian improvement 
- a simple example of d 
f rent criteria. 
set of national income max s 
by maximising real national income wi 
tariff vecto subject to the budget constra 
for tari vector, i.e, 
max se 
model a 
ome at 
by impos-
ituation 
national 
ent res ts 
t 1 may be 
re e t to 
o lng 
Max L '" w[ (I "I" t) P] V[ (I + t) P] + A [ wV] 
re A is the L rangrian and X the consumption 0 
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expression for the income maximising tariff vector, even In 
the two factor-two good case, is cumbersome anJ witllout 
simple interpretation. 
Estimation Problems 
The model is a general equilibrium construct where, 
from general equilibrium theory, all relative prices enter 
every supply and demand function. Economic theo provides 
no a priori information on the values of the coefficients of 
prices and in particular where they are zero (or on the 
mathematical form of the structural equations) and there-
fore this investigator has no basis for identifying the 
structural equations. As Liu (14, p.456) has pointed out 
ordinary least squares regressions on the predetermined 
variables In the reduced form is an acceptable estimation 
technique In this situation and allows consistent prediction 
of the values of the endogenous variables. 
It is by no means clear that this lack of identifica--
tion and the consequent use of O.L.S. on the reduced form 
is any loss from the point of view of prediction. FIML 
would in any case be ruled out as an estimating technique 
because of a lack of observations. However, were the struc-
tural form to be identified the technique used to estimate it 
would have oeen 2 SLS. Now Dhrymes (5) shows that, in 
general, Dne has no grounds based on asymptotic efficiency 
for prefering 2 SLS derived estimates of restricted 
reduced form to OLS on an unrestricted reduced form viz. 
Lemma 5: Unless (a) the covariance matr of the structural 
err rs is diagonal, or (b) all e ations of the 
system are just identified, 2 SLS In ed re-
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stricted reduced rm are, asymptotically, 
neither efficient nor fficient Telat to 
unrestricted ( ) form es to s, 
s (2 p, 8) 
Therefore even if t tructural form we i t 
ied it is not clear that would be any los 
by the use of OLS est te of the reduced form ra I' 
than predictions based on estimates of the structural I'm, 
The relatively small number of observations rema 5 
a problem in the selected stimation technique whi may be 
overcome by either a two t incipal components 1'0 
or by using O,L.S. on p a1 components of pre-
determined variables. orne of the current reseal' of 
Giles, D,E,A, , A,C, as yet unr rt d S 5 
that each approach s the same asymptotic p op rties as 2 
SLS derived and e t tes of the reduced I'm provi d 
that as the number of servations tends to 1 so 
the number of pI' components tends to number of 
pre-determined vari les. On that assumption one i still 
within the ambit 0 s' lemma S. A tion e I' 
choice of pI' al components has been d 
(1) who has shown minimising unconditional mean 
square foreca~t error one chooses ipa components 
of the pre term 
roots. Two 0 
the reduced 
will not 
eluded are 
the effi 
Y :: nv.v. 
1 ] 
I'm 
d variables correspond g to 
of estimation ema 
vel ed may omit some 
cons s en if the va 1 
f error te 
t es 1 1 y 
1 HT combination 
largest 
that (I 
1 ; thi s 
are in-
a loss in 
() ll1ce 
t tes of 
84. 
\11., V. a confidence interval on the forecast Y is not read-
l l 
ily available i.e. a method for estimating a confidence 
interval has not been found. 
Estimation 
The reduced form obtained from the theoretical model 
glven in equation (7) has a drawback in that it is an equil-
ibrium system; static equilibrium was not a state character-
istic of the New Zealand economy over the estimating period, 
1952-72, Additional variables are introduced to equation 
(7) to provide a reduced form for estimating purposes which 
goes some of the way towards catching the disequilibrium 
effects, 
Disequilibrium changes involve the adjustment of 
the actual capital stocks to the desired stocks over time. 
There is no theoretically satisfactory way of determining 
desired capital stocks - though distributed lag models may 
provide good approximations in many situations - and recog-
nising the importance of the capital variables, changing with 
time, it was decided to include the capital stock of each 
industry as well as time as indicators of disequilibrium 
processes in the reduced form. 
Rates of the taxation of personal incomes are easily 
introduced into the formal model as parameters and since 
these rates, showing wide variation over the sample period, 
are expected to influence the supplies of labour they have 
been included in the reduced form. The opportunity cost of 
labour is contained in w but since the estimates are res-
tricted to a subgroup of industries income per head of the 
labour forces was chosen as the proxy. 
The estimated verSIon of the reduceJ form obtained 
from equations (7) is 
v. 0 1 2 3 4 5 :::: a.P + a.K + a·T + a.t + a.U + a. + ~1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
W. - 0p b~K 2 + b ~t + b ~U + b~ b. + + b.T + ~2 (12 ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S. 0 ly 2 3 4 5 == c.P + C. \ + C.T + c.t + c.U + c. s3 + 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
M. d?P d~K 2 d~t d~U £, == + + d.T + + + d. + E;4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
where i refers to an industry, all variables are measured at 
period t and 
V. 
1 
is the number of hours worked by wage earners in 
industry i 
W. 
1 
is the hourly wage rate, deflated by the consumer 
price index~ in industry i 
S. IS salary income in industry 1 
1 
M. is a proxy for profit income 
1 Surplus - in industry i 
Manufacturing 
P is the vector of the first three principal com-
ponents of twenty six deflated New Zealand prices 
of manufactured goods 
K IS the vector of the first two principal components 
of the capital series for the twenty five indust-
rles 
T is the vector of the first three principal com-
ponents of the deflated taxation series converted 
to an hourly rate of tax 
t is time 
U is the opportunity cost of labour to each industry, 
being the deflated per capita national income 
1 i i 
a., b., c., 
J J J 
estimated 
d~ are the unknown parameters to be 
J 
s· is the error term, 
1 
System (12) yields a predicted value of income 
generated ih the twenty five industries for P = P 
A A A A 
Y = Iw.V. + IS. + IM. 1 1 1 1 
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and the predicted value of the change In income generated 
by a change in P is 
A A A 
dy :::: Iw.dV. + IV.dw. + IdS. + IdM. (13 ) 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 1 
A variation in the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agree-
ment [2] . . lS one source of dy. 
It will have been noticed that the vectors P, K, T 
have been defined as the principal components respectively 
of all the underlying matrices of observations on prices, 
capital stocks and taxation, In the observation matrix on, 
say, taxation it is a reasonable supposition that the con-
stituent vectors are less than fully independent of each 
other since government sets the tax rates, Similarly, 
capital stocks jn different industries may be time correlat-
ed and upset the independence assumption. Deflated price 
vectors, the only available indicator of relative prices 
could also move together in some sense. The method of 
principal components is one way of separating out how much 
independence lithere really is" in each of the observation 
matrices 8 T ] by it one obtains new variables uncorrelated 
with each other but explaining a high proportion of the 
variance of the original variables, Three principal com-
ponents of the price vector were chosen because they accoun-
ted for 99% of the variance in the matrix of observations 
[2] The New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement, 
Wellington, 31 August 1965, Appendix A17 to the 
Journals of the House of Representatives (New Zealand) 
1965 R,E OiVen, Government Printer. 
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on twenty six deflated prices. Two principal components of 
capital stocks were selected, explaining 99% of the variance 
in those series while 96% of the variance in the taxation 
series was explained by its three largest principal compon-
ents. With just twenty one annual observations the princip-
al components approach (by lowering the number of exogenous 
variables in the reduced form) has, as it were, the effect 
of improving the balance between the number of variables and 
the number of observations. All of the degrees of freedom 
have not been used up, to do so would have been to impose a 
less severe test of the model. 
DATA 
[ i] Coverage 
Statistics for the New Zealand Manufacturing sector 
have been compiled at the three digit S.l.T.C. level since 
1951-2 and the series runs to 1971-2 ~t the {ime of writin~) 
to provide at most twenty one observations on each industry. 
Many series are incomplete and where this occurred the 
industry concerned was excluded from the study, A variety 
of calculations has been performed on the raw data - divid-
ing wage bills by annual hours worked by wage earners for 
example - and subsidiary series often had to be built up to 
perform the ~alculations - such as annual hours worked by 
wage earners in each industry - which do not appear in the 
data presented in the appendix to this chapter. The sub-
sidiary series often contained gaps which resulted in the 
elimination of additional industries from the investigation. 
About three-quarters of this work was done by the writer 
over an eight year period. A route guide through the data 
1 S no,\' provided. 
[ii] Prices ries 
The conception of 
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study is to modify domestic 
prices of goods by us the 1 country assumption 
association with a hypothetical tariff change and followi 
effects through to ctor incomes by industry. Detailed 
time series on real prices e industry are at e centre 
of e work. Each indust produces many commodities so a 
weighted average price was t l' each industry. An 
's product was def d by the units of measurement -
e,g, llons of output for paint and varnish - so that the 
wei ed average price reflects many components which for 
a r purposes may be viewed as prices of differently de 
d commodities. Water based p nts and plastic paints, 
bo being measured in gallons provi a weighted price per 
gallon where the weighting is acco to gallons of each. 
The pro 5 of an industry may not s be measured in 
same UJilits chemical pro s be measured in cwt 
or in Ions, In this situation proce was to chose 
the units, either cwt or gallons, whi rna greatest 
contribution to the value of output and to use chosen 
units as wei s. Every price series is deflated by the ~ 
March Consumer Price Index Series. The source of the price 
series is "Statistics of Industrial Pro tion" 
Government tel', Wellington, for the va ous aI's. 
[ iii] Hours Worked by Wage Series 
Data is available only on overtime hour wo d by 
indust in e But since overt are de-
fined as hours excess of forty hours per week a straight-
forward calcula ion gives the number of hours wo ed. From 
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the number of male plus t number of female wage earners, 
each of whom is assumed to wo 
nine weeks per year at ord 
hours worked per year is obta 
overtime worked in e 
cd by industryo 
rty hours for fo 
wage rates, the 0 
d and added to the 
try to yield annual hours wo 
[ i v] Hourly Wage es Series 
of 
The income of wage earners in an indistry is the sum 
of female annual wage income and male annual wage income pub 
lished in the Statistics of Industrial Production. The sums 
were deflated by the March umer Price Index series and 
d ided by the annual hours worked, 
[v] Salary Incomes Series 
annu 
By deducting female plus 
wage plus salary income 
e 
try by industry. 
incomes from 
Stat tics of 
In trial Production and deflat by the March Consumers 
Price Index one obtains real salaries one industry for 
one aI', 
Profi t or Manufactur es Series 
Data on reported profits is not publi for the 
three digit level - Manufacturing be the proxy 
r pro ts published for each in t It is tersely de-
fined as 
available to manufacturers prior to 
payment of dividends~ taxation 
riations" 
in the 1961 2 S atistics of Industri 
Vll, This ta was collected and 
five ties r the twenty one 
p 
ated 
aI's. 
a 
tion at page 
twenty 
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Series [vii] Capital St 
The Statistics of I trial Production defines the 
capital stock of an industry as its Land, Buildings, Plant 
Machinery and Transport book value as at 
March 1951 is published as are additions to capital 
stocks by year. The series of C ital Stocks contained in 
the appendix to this te was assembled by (i) deprecia t-
lng the 1951 book va at 10% p.a. (straight line) then 
deflating the diminish s by the Wholesale Price Index 
for the appropriate ars. (ii) The additions for 1951-2 
were deflated and reciated then added to the depreciated, 
deflated March 1951 book value to give the March 1952 Capital 
stock for each indust (ii) Capital stocks for 1953 were 
obtained from de ated and depreciated (a) 1952 additions 
and (b) 1953 additions. The general point is that the 
capital series are not merely the deflated published book 
values. An tryis 1972 capital stock is the sum of 
twenty two 
second be 
s, the first being inherited capital, the 
what remains of the 1952 additions after they 
have been depreci and deflated twenty one times, 
th d be twenty times deflated and depreciated value 
of 1953 tions etc. Similarly for each other years' 
capital sto ~ for every industry. 
Ld rsonal Income Taxes Series 
C.P.I de ated wage and sal s r an 
t \vas ded by the number of employees ar by 
year to obta an average employee real income. 
tion was made that each employee could claim two 
amounts which 
and rop 
anged several times during 
iate sums were deducted to obta 
assump 
ions 
Ie period 
a net 
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income (in the taxation law sense of that term). The margin-
al tax rates were applied at the relevent increments of 
income to obtain the annual income tax payable on the average 
income. Since marginal tax rates change frequently care was 
taken to use each year's marginal rates. Early in the sample 
period surcharges were added by the government to the income 
tax and these have been included in the series. Additional 
taxation by way of the Social Security charges at 7~% have 
been included for those years in which it was payable as have 
been any rebates of tax, The annual deflated tax payable on 
the average employee income was then converted to an hourly 
rate by dividing by 1960, Such a time series was developed 
for each industry and is presented in the appendix to this 
chapter. 
[ixl Labour's Opportunity Cost Series 
This series is the deflated national income per head 
of the labour force 
ESTIMATES OF EQUATIONS (12) 
The tabulations which follow are the details of the 
O.L.S. estimates of the reduced form equations (12). The 
purpose of the estimate is to make a prediction so the high 
values of the R2 for most equations is a happy circumstance. 
The general]'· poor standard errors are less worrisome than 
they would have been if the aim were to examine the correct-
ness of the specification of a structural form. One cannot 
determine the structural form from the estimates because it 
is under identified. The Durbin-Watson Statistic is tolerably 
good for many equations. By and large the estimates are sat-
isfactory particularly when one recalls that the finest 
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possible level of diaggregation of the industrial data was 
selected for study, 
~ 
To obtain R~ above O,g r twenty of the twenty five 
industries salary equations is reasonably good. Thirteen 
R2 above O,g for annual hours d. by industry is accept-
able. Profit equatious eleven R2 above 0.9, performed as 
expected and even hourly wage equations with eight R2 
exceeding 0.9 while not consistently good have a useful 
degree of ct power for many three digit industries. 
The sub-he the tabulation indicate the 
(standardised) endo variable concerned. Reading down 
the table, the first number in each section is the estimated 
coefficient of rst principal component of prices. The 
second number estimated coefficient of the second 
component of prices; the third number is the estimated co-
ef cient of third pr ipal component of prices. The 
fourth and numbers are respectively the estimated co-
efficients of the first and second principal components of 
the c it stocks, The sixth, seventh and eight numbers 
are re ect ly the estimates of the cae cients of 
rst second and third principal components of the tax 
series. second last number is the estimated cae icient 
of time and the final number in a section is estimated 
cae cient of the opportunity cost of labour, All exo 
ous variables have been standardised by the tors shown 
the data appendix. In the table of results runn for the 
next 26 pages V., W., M., S. are respect 
1 111 
ly endogenous 
variables for hours of work by wage earners hourly wage rates, 
profits and salary income in indust i. 
ESTIMATED REDUCED FORMS 
Ordinary Least Squares Regression 
for the Indicated Endogenous Variables 
follow for the next twenty six p s. 
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5 Annual hours worked by wage earners in the 
VZOOxlO Meat Feeezing and Preserving Industry 
Coeffi ents 
-0.0116 
0.0045 
0.0069 
-0.0018 
Standa 
0.0154 
0.0056 
0.0098 
0.0024 
Errors 
Constant 459.9419 
R2 
.978 
-0.0008 
0.0029 
0.0101 
0,0013 
0.0406 
0.0061 
0,0023 
0.0034 
o . 01 ~ 2 
0.0425 
0.1689 
0.0340 
F 46.5484 
dw 1. 6139 
3 Hourly Wage Rates for wage earners in the 
W200 xl0 Meat Freezing & Preserving Industry 
0.0325 
-0.0077 
0,0358 
0.0048 
0.0009 
-0,0005 
-0.0404 
-0.1142 
0.5216 
-0.0002 
a • 0213. 
0.0077 
0.0136 
0.0033 
0.0033 
0,0047 
0.0196 
0.0588 
0.2337 
0.0471 
Constant = 472.3111 
R2 = .92 
F 11.512 
dw = 1.1256 
-4 Annual profits (i.e. Manufacturing Surplus) 
M200 xl0 in the Meat Freezing & Preserving Industry 
0.3935 0.3117 
-0.0430 0.1130 Constant -9427.4373 
0.3051 0.1990 
0.0664 0.0489 R2 .404 
-0.0088 0.0481 F .6786 
-0,0194 0.0688 
-0.3988 0.2870 dw :::: 2.1648 
-1.2026 0.8589 
4.5543 3.4091 
0.0998 0.6877 
-4 Annual hours worked by wage earners in the VZOSxl0 
Bacon & Ham Curing Industry 
0.01:)0 0.0126 
-O.uu97 0.0045 Constant :::: -424.59,67 0.0083 0,0080 
R2 
-0.0020 0.0.019 := .454 
0.0006 0.0019 F 
'" 20.8444 
-0,0028 0,0028 
-0,0112 0,0116 dw '" 1.9631 
0,0092 0.0349 
0.2013 0,1385 
0.0357 0,0279 
94, 
Coe 
Ilou r1 y Wage RQ tes fo::' wage OR rno1's in the 
Ham and Bac0n curing Industry 
cients Standard Errors 
0.0208 0.0174 
-0.0019 0.0063 Constant == 339.3136 
0.0134 0.0111 RZ 0.0019 0.0027 - .458 
0.0028 0.0026 F ,8479 
0.0008 0,0038 
0,0152 0.0160 dw 2.0451 
-0,0658 0.0479 
0,1338 0.1904 
0,0408 0.0384 
95, 
Annual profits (i,e. Manufacturing Surplus) 
in the Ham and Bacon curing Industry 
- 0,0180 
-0.0688 
-0,0428 
-0.0165 
0,0016 
0.00S7 
0.1201 
0,1246 
-0,9083 
0.3555 
0,0853 
0.0309 
0.0544 
0.0134 
0.0131 
0.0188 
0,0785 
0.2350 
0.9328 
0.1881 
Constant 01303,2491 
R2 .907 
F = 9.8402 
dw =: 2.0370 
-3 V207xl0 
Annual hours worked 
Sausage 
0.0193 
by wage earners in the 
Casings Industry 
0.0055 
-0.0107 
-0,0032 
-0.0031 
0.0062 
-0.0005 
0.0171 
0.0479 
0.0036 
-0.0170 
W207x10 
3 
0.0501 
0.0051 
-0,0340 
-0.0016 
0,0013 
0.0002 
0.0288 
0,1374 
-0.2859 
0.0235 
Hourly 
0.0070 
0.0123 
0,0030 
0.0029 
0.0042 
0.0178 
0.0534 
0.2117 
0.0427 
Wage Rates 
Constant 
RZ 
F 
dw 
for wage 
Sausage Casings 
0.0207 
0.0075 
0,0132 Constant 
0,0032 RZ 
0.0032 F 0,0045 
0.0190 dw 
0.0571 
0.2268 
0.0457 
515.044 
=: ~ 944 
17,1303 
== 1. 8243 
earners in 
Industry 
the 
1446.1727 
=: 
.906 
9.604 
=: 2,1773 
10- 4 Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing Surplus) 
in the Sausage Casings Industry 
Coefficients Standard rors 
-0.0282 
-0.0079 
-0.0165 
0.0232 
0.0084 
0.0148 
0.0036 
0.0035 
0,0051 
0.0214 
0,0640 
0.2542 
0.0512 
Constant 374.055 
-0.0063 R2 = .752 
0.0023 
-0.0059 
0.0410 
0.1346 
-0.3972 
0.0677 
F 3.0417 
dw = 2.0233 
Annual hours wo d by wage earners in 
the By Industry 
0.0111 0.0152 
-0.0009 
0.0097 
0.0020 
-0.0006 
0.0010 
-0.0061 
0,0040 Constant =-173.5747 0.0071 
0.0017 R2 .590 
-0.0353 
0.0696 
0.0091 
0.0017 F 
0.0024 
0.0102 dw 
0.0306 
0.1217 
0.0245. 
L 4405 
L 7401 
3 W232 x10 Hourly e Rates for wage earners in the Brewing Industry 
0.0003 0.0267 
-0.0023 0 .. 0096 Constant -231.9564 
0.0038 0.0170 
0.0072 0.0042 R2 .919 
0.0009 0.0041 F 
0.0055 0.0059 '" 11.4110 
-0.0245 0.0246 dw 1.6016 
-0.0372 0.0736 
0.2720 0.2923 
0.0710 0.0589 
-4 Annual M232 xl0 in 
Profits (i.e. Manufactur 
Brewing Industry 
·0.0638 0.1208 
0,03Rtl 
0.Ob44 
-0.0017 
0.0118 
0.0066 
-0.0085 
-0.1092 
0,5240 
-0,2084 
0.0231 
0.0407 
0.0100 
0.0098 
0.0141 
0.0588 
0.1759 
0.6985 
0.1409 
Constant '" 
R2 
F 
dw 
Surp 
933.056 
.935 
14.663 
2.6399 
96. 
) 
97, 
V 0- 3 Annual hours worked by wage earners in 
236
xl 
the Aerated Waters & Cordials Industry 
Coe icients Standard Errors 
-0.0691 
0.0167 
-0.0363 
0.0005 
, 0.0004 
-0.0014 
0.0476 
0.0172 
0.0303 
0.0074 
0.0073 
0.0105 
0.0438 
0.1311 
0,5205 
0.1050 
Constant 
R2 
1622.8176 
;:: 0943 
-0.0156 
0.0406 
0.2757 
0.0896 
F 
dw 
~ 16.8448 
'" L 3494 
Hourly Wage Rates for wage earners in 
Aerated Waters & Cordials Industry the 
0.0099 0.0068 
-0.0001 0,0024 Constant 72,6362 0,0023 0.0043 2 
0.0016 0,D010 R = .864 
0.0007 0.0010 F 
0.0000 0.0015 
-0.0033 0.0062 dw 
-0.0006 0.0187 
0.0506 0.0745 
0.0100 0.0150 
Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing 
in the Aerated Waters & Cordials 
-0.1131 0.0998 
-0.0889 0.0362 
6.3993 
1. 8645 
Surplus) 
Industry 
0.0688 0.0637 
-0.0052 0.0156 
Constant 
R2 
391.9798 
= 0957 
-0.0076 0.0154 
0.0023 0,0220 F 
o . 0962 0 . 0919 dw 
0.3877 0.2750 
0.5524 1,0918 
0.4952 0.2202 
Annual hours worked by wage earners 
the Woollen Milling Industry 
-0.0231 0.0327 
22.5004 
0.0120 0.0118 Constant = 566.2341 
0.0245 0,0208 R2 
-u,0138 0.0051 '" .968 
0.0107 0.0050 F -- 30.767 
0.0055 0.0072 
o . 0564 0 . 0301 dw 2 . 0707 
0.1551 0.0900 
0.3466 0.3575 
0.0977 0.0721 
98. 
3 Hourly Wage Rates for wage earners in the 
W251 xlO Woollen Milling Industry 
V260 xl0 
-4-
W260Xl0
3 
Coe icients Standard Errors 
0.0059 
-0.0029 
~0.0035 
0.0009 
0.0023 
0.0029 
0.0112 
0,0040 
0.1505 
0.0878 
0.0140 
0.0050 
0.0089 
0.0022 
0.0021 
0.0030 
0.0128 
0.0385 
0.1530 
0.0308 
tant '" 52.8369 
dw 
.849 
5.649 
2.3437 
Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing Surplus) 
In the Woollen Milling Industry 
-0.0255 
-0.0019 
-0.0171 
0.0124 
0.0087 
0.0124 
0.0372 
o . 0195 
-0.4314 
0.0736 
Annual hours wo 
Hosiery and 
0.0 6 
0.0051 
-0.0254 
-0.0055 
0.0044 
0.0105 
0.0291 
0.0152 
-0.1978 
0.0283 
0.0416 
0.0151 Constant 
0.0266 
0.0065 R2 
0.0064 F 
0.0092 
0.0383 dw 
0.1148 
0.4558 
0.0919 
d by wage earners 
other Knitting mills 
0.0326 
0,0118 Constant 
0.0208 R2 0.0051 
0.0050 F 
0.0072 dw 0.0300 
0.0898 
0.3566 
0.0719 
401.615 
=: G 465 
8708 
1.7768 
in the 
1468.6993 
.947 
17.9828 
2.3310 
Hourly Wage Rates for wage earners in the 
Hosiery and other Knitting mill 
-0.0665 O. 0692 
0.0122 0.0251 Constant 2346.6814 
-0.0490 0.0442 
-0.0175 0.0108 R2 .453 
0.0003 0,0107 F .8295 0.0153 -0.0140 
0.0797 0.0637 dw 1. 7373 
0.1710 0.1908 
-0,8565 0.7575 
-0.0178 0.1528 
Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing Suprlus) 
in the Hosiery and other Knitting Mills 
99. 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
0.0331 , 0.0312 
0.0130 0.0113 Constant '" 0,0151 0.0199 275.0344 
-0.0037 0.0049 R2 .8857 
0.0045 0.0048 F 7.7513 
-0.0046 0.0069 
-0.0004 0.0287 dw 2.8712 
0,0112 0.0861 
0.2058 0.3418 
-0.1253 0,0689 
- 3 Annual hours worked by wage earners in the V262 x10 Hosiery and other Knit ng Mills 
0.0248 0.0295 
0.0061 0,0107 Constant -64.5981 0.0065 0.0188 
::: 
-0.0002 0.0046 R2 .8323 
0.0011 0.0045 F 4,9634 0.0017 0.0065 
0.0097 0.0272 dw 2 .4367 
0,0234 0.0815 
-0.0886 0.3235 
-0,0243 0,0652 
W26Z XI0
3 Hourly Wage Rates for wage earners the Hosiery and 0 Knitting Mills 
-0.0069 0.0175 
0.0000 0.0063 Constant 624,2117 0.0135 0,0112 
::: 
-0.0003 0.0027 R2 .5275 
0.0021 0.0027 F ,5275 
-0,0004 0.0038 
0.0156 0.0161 dw :::: L 7569 
0.0525 0.0484 
-0.1271 0.1923 
-0.0100 0.0388 
-3 Annual Profits Ci, e, Manufacturing Surplus) in MZ62 xl0 the Hosiery and other itting Mills 
0.0313 0.0163 
0,0033 0.0059 Constant ::: -173.7685 C.0151 0,0104 
R2 0.0037 0,0025 :::: .829 
0.0039 0.0025 F 4.8539 0,0049 0,0036 
-0.0058 0.0150 -- L 7896 
-0,0263 0.0451 
0.0955 0,1793 
-0,0690 0.0 1 
100. 
-3 Annual hours worked by wage earners In 
VZ63xl0 Linen Flax Industry 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
0.0080 
-0.0007 
-0.0063 
-0.0021 
0.0053 
0.0005 
0.0397 
0.0587 
-0.4864 
0.0263 
0,0207 
0,0075 
0,0132 
0,0032 
0.0032 
0.0045 
0,0191 
0.0571 
0.Z268 
0,0457 
Constant 
RZ 
F 
dw 
332.6852 
.926 
12.5826 
1.2094 
Hourly Wage Rates 
Linen Flax 
r wage earners in 
0.0377 
-0,0152 
0.0312 
0,0041 
-0.0053 
-0.0013 
-0.0563 
-0.1322 
0.6418 
0.0112 
Industry 
0.0134 
0.0048 
0,0086 
0.0021 
0.0020 
0,0029 
0,0124 
0.0371 
0.1473 
0.0297 
Constant 
RZ 
F 
dw 
-3 Annual Pro ts (i.e. Manufacturi 
MZ63 xl0 the Flax Industry 
-0.0115 
0.0102 
-0.0012 
-0.0021 
0.0026 
0.0051 
0.0104 
-0.0104 
-0.1982 
0.0396 
0.0207 
0.0075 
0.0132 
0.0032 
0.0032 
0.0045 
0.0191 
0.0572 
0.2272 
0.0458 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
829.0391 
= .871 
== 6.8023 
:::: 2.3608 
Surplus) in 
102.3909 
.393 
.6494 
:::: 2.1825 
5 V27 +x10 
Annual hours worked by 
Clothing Industry 
e earners In the 
-0.0299 0.0098 
0.0074 0.0035 
-0.0169 0.0063 
0.0033 0,0015 
0.0029 0,0015 
0.0034 0.0021 
0.0268 0.0091 
0.0722 0.0272 
-0.3280 0.1081 
0.0408 0,0218 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
857.3744 
.8633 
6.4836 
:::: 2.2122 
101. 
W 1 3 Hourly Wa Rates for wage earners in the 
27+x 0 Clothing Industry 
Coef cients Standard Errors 
-4 V300 xlO 
0.0031 
0.0007 
0.0041 
0.0004 
0.0007 
0.0017 
-0.0053 
-0.0057 
0.0987 
-0.0061 
0.0039 
0.0014 
0.0025 
0.0006 
0.0006 
0.0008 
0.00 
0.0110 
0.0436 
0.0088 
Constant := 184.4673 
= .985 R2 
F = 69.9446 
dw = 1.7265 
Annual Profits (i.e. Manu cturing Surplus) 
0.0496 
0.0295 
0.0496 
-0.0005 
0.0033 
0,0082 
-0.0188 
-0.1176 
0.1544 
o .0393 
Annual 
-0.0124 
-0.0287 
-0.0107 
-0.0076 
0.0000 
-0.C110 
-0.0066 
0.0602 
0.2452 
-0.0288 
in th~ Clothing Industry 
0.0393 
0.0142 
0.02S1 
0.0061 
0.0060 
0.0086 
0.0362 
0.1083 
0.4300 
0,0867 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
-831.5562 
;;: .905 
:::: 9.5518 
= 3.0432 
hours worked by wage earners in 
the Clothing Industry 
0.0712 
0.0258 Constant = 
0.0454 1373.0115 
0.0111 
0.0110 
0.0157 F 
0.0655 dw 
0.1962 
0.7789 
0.1571 
:= .372 
= .5933 
2.8980 
Hourly Wage Rates for wage earners in 
the Clothing Industry 
-0.0101 
0.0095 
1l.0074 
0.0002 
0.0000 
0.0033 
0.0027 
-0.0327 
0.1530 
0.0845 
0.0359 
0.0130 
0.0229 
0.0056 
0.0055 
0.0079 
0.0331 
0.0991 
O. 3934 
0.0793 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
182.2522 
:.: .38164 
.6172 
;: 3.2302 
102 
-4 Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing Surp ) in 
M300 x10 the Clothing Industry 
- 5 V360 x10 
W360xl0 
3 
M360xl0 
- 3 
Coefficients 
-0.0532 
0,0066 
-0.0372 
-0.0087 
0.0048 
-0.0042 
0,0855 
0.2253 
-0.8861 
0.1182 
Annual hours wo 
Motor Vehicle 
-0.0062 
0.0058 
0.0030 
0.0004 
-0.0007 
0,0025 
-0.0095 
-0.0275 
0.0310 
0.0504 
Standard Errors 
0.0206 
0.0075 
0,0132 
O. 00 32 
0.0031 
0.0045 F 
0.0190 
0.0569 
0.2261 
0.0456 
Constant 
R2 
dw 
843.6056 
.943 
'" 16.6868 
2,4521 
ed by wage earners in the 
Tyres and Tubes Industry 
0.0094 
0,0034 
0.0060 Constant = -48.9001 
0.0014 R2 
0.0014 F 
0.0020 
0.0087 dw 
0.0260 
0.1035 
0.0208 
,8953 
8,5523 
= 1. 9208 
Hourly Wage Rates r wage earners in the 
Motor Vehicle Tyres and Tubes Industry 
-0.0365 0.0320 
-0.0089 0,0116 Constant 825.1213 
-0.0186 0.0204 
-0.0017 0,0050 R2 = .9533 
-0.0040 0.0049 F 20.4175 
-0.0075 0.0070 
;: 
0.0141 0.0294 dw = 2.4646 
0,0282 0.0882 
-0.0013 0,3502 
0.0653 0.0706 
Annual Profits Ci, e. cturing Surplus) In 
the Motor Vehicle Tyres and Tubes Industry 
-0.1498 0.3345 
0.0820 0.1213 Constant 1119.2141 
-0.0551 0,2135 
R2 
-0.0656 0,0525 .6333 
0.0289 0.0517 F 1.7271 0.0118 0.07 
0.1666 0.3080 dw = 2.4176 
0.2702 0.9217 
-2.3353 3.6586 
0.7018 0.7380 
103. 
V36 10-
4 Annual Hours worked earners in the Rubber Goods 
(other than Motor & Tubes) Industry 
Coefficients S dErrors 
-0.0198 0.0124 
0.0059 0.0045 Constant 297.9613 0,0079 
:= 
-0.0025 
R2 
-0.0046 0.0019 ::0 .9640 
0.0032 0.0019 F 26.8540 0.0069 0.0027 '" 
0.0159 0.0114 dw ::: L 7868 
-0.0164 0.0343 
- 0 > 2036 0.1364 
0.0774 0.0275 
W 10 3 Hourly Wage wage earners in the Rubber Goods 
363x (other than Motor Vehicle Tyres & Tubes) Industry 
-0.1595 0.1078 
0.0170 0.0391 
-0,1112 0.0688 Constant::: 4743.7639 
-0.0301 0.0169 R2 ::: .4064 
0.0006 0.0166 F .6849 
0.0216 0.0238 
0.1636 0.0993 dw ::: 2.2367 
0.4183 0.2972 
-1,7397 1.1796 
-0.0073 0.2379 
- 3 Armua1 (Le. Manufacturing Surplus) 
M363x10 Goods (other than Motor Vehicle Tyres and Tubes) 
-0.1077 0.0963 
0,0118 0.0349 Constant 2154.8411 OQ0779 O~061S -
-0.0410 0,0151 R2 '" .8535 
0.0103 0.0148 F = 5.8304 
-0.0145 0.0212 
O. 1872 0 . 0887 dw = 1. 8491 
0.5025 0.2654 
1.8558 1.0537 
0.2371 0.2125 
-4 Annual Hours worked by wage earners in the V366 x10 Vulc sing & Tyre Retreadi try 
-0.0017 0.0062 
0,0008 0.0022 tant 110.0728 0.0040 
:= 
-0.0014 
R2 
-0.0005 0.0009 = .9427 
0,0010 0.0009 F 16.4603 0.0021 0.0013 
0.0017 0.0057 dw 2.7454 
-0.0176 0.0173 
0,0027 0.0687 
0,0021 000138 
104. 
-3 Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing Surplus) in 
M366xl0 the Vulcanising & Tyre Retreading Industry 
W370 x10 
3 
M370 x10 
3 
Coefficients 
-0.3019 
0.0537 
0.2029 
0.0174 
-0.0149 
-0,0093 
0.2718 
0.6914 
2.4788 
0.4136 
Standa rd Errors 
0.1253 
0.0454 
0.0800 
0.0196 
0.0193 
0.0276 
0.1154 
0.3453 
L 3707 
0.2765 
Constant 4573.6665 
R2 "" .9418 
F = 16.2054 
dw 2,0663 
I 
Annual hours worked by w e earners in the 
Chemical Fertilizer Industry 
0.0308 0.0303 
0.0008 0.0110 Constant 626.3710 0.0165 0.0193 := 
0.0008 0.0047 R2 
.4396 
0.0054 0.0046 
.7846 0.0007 0.0067 F 
-0.0194 0.0279 dw ::: 2.2482 
-0.0628 0.0836 
0.2000 0.3320 
0.0241 0.0669 
Hourly Wage Rates r wage earners in the 
Chemical Fertilizer Industry 
0.1004 0.0751 
-0.0147 0.0272 Constant -1815.7792 0.0667 0.0479 
-0,0081 0.0118 R2 
.7750 
-0.0137 0.Oit16 F 3.4445 0.0121 0.0165 
0.0624 0.0691 dw 1.8021 
-0.3877 0.2069 
0.6641 0.8214 
0.0035 0.1657 
Annual Profits (i. e. Manufacturing Surplus) 
in the Chemical Fertilizer Industry 
-0.1219 0.3829 
0,1782 0.1389 Constant 3374.5658 0,0288 0.2444 
-(1,0102 0,0601 R2 
.767 
0,0381 0.0591 F 3.2988 0.2136 0.0846 =: 
0.1822 0.3526 dw :::: 2.2359 
0.3925 1,0551 
-2.4617 4.1879 
0.2700 0.8448 
105. 
V
37Z
XIO- 3 Annual hours worked by wage earners in the 
Vegetable & Animal Oils & Fats Industry 
Cae icients Standard Errors 
-0.0309 
0.0055 
0.0107 
0.0122 
0.0017 
0.0144 
0.0000 
-0.0295 
0.0736 
0.0568 
0,0317 
0.0115 
0.0202 
0.0049 
0.0049 
0.0070 
0.0292 
0.0873 
0.3468 
0.0699 
Cons tan t 
R2 
F 
dw 
1178.1330 
:= .8245 
4. 7 
"" 2.1821 
Hourly Wage 
Vegetable & 
Rates for wage earners in the 
Annimal Oils and Fats Industry 
- 0.,0040 
0.0036 
-0.0101 
0.0035 
0,0000 
0.0122 
0.0044 
0.0078 
Constant = 499.2719 
·0.0019 
0.0018 
0.0027 
0.0113 
0,0338 
0.1342 
0.0270 
R2 .9463 
F 17.655 
-0.0033 
0.0048 
0.0383 
o . 0101 
dw 2.7265 
-0.0048 
Annual Profits (i.e. Manufacturing 
t61~066!etable 
0.0203 
0,0350 
-0.0076 
-0.0144 
0.0015 
0.0790 
0.1329 
-0.8731 
0.1877 
& Animal Oils & Fats 
0.0330 
0.0119 
0.0210 
0.0051 
0.0051 
0.0073 
0.0304 dw 
0.0910 
Constant 
R2 
F 
0.3613 
0.0729 
Surplus) in 
Industry 
779.0239 
0,9 
=: 9.0337 
2.4814 
-3 Annual hours worked by wage earners in the 
V377xlO Vegetable & Animal Oils & Fats Industry 
0.0832 0.0452 
0.0098 0.0163 Constant 767.6464 
-0.0173 0.0288 R2 
- 0 . 0 12 7 0 . 0 a 7 1 == ;' 7 0 8 7 
0.0089 0.0069 F '" 2.4336 
0.0073 000099 
o . 0927 0 .0416 dw 2. 4452 
.1409 0.1245 
.2818 0.4943 
.t819 0.0997 
106. 
3 - Hourly wage rates for wage earners in the W377 x10 soap industry 
Coe cients Standard Errors 
0.0228 0.0515 
0.0323 0.0186 
0.0218 0.0329 Constant "" 767.6464 
0,0051 0.0081 
.7087 0.0045 0.0079 F 2.4336 0.0336 0.0113 dw 2.4262 
-0.0231 0.0474 
-0.1240 0.1420 
0,2478 0.5637 
-0.1346 0.1137 
- 3 Annual profits in the M377 x10 soap dus 
0.1093 0.2150 
-0,0 1 0.0779 
0.0946 0.1372 Q!<)nstant =2555,2475 
0,0131 0.0337 R2 620 . 0,0245 0,0332 F = L 6327 0.0083 0.0475 dw = L 6338 
-0.2131 O. 1979 
-0.4972 0.5923 
2.6251 2.3512 
0.0669 0,4742 
- 5 - Annual hours worked by wage earners in V380 xlO the Pa s and Varnish Industry 
-0.0122 0.0066 
0,0020 0.0024 
0.0030 0,0042 Constant 274,1801 
-0,0013 0 0010 R2 
,7489 '" 0.0002 0.0010 F 
'" 2,9839 0,0007 0.0014 dw = 2.2839 0,0005 0,0061 
0.0021 0.0184 
0,0623 0.0731 
0.0243 0.0147 
3 Hourly wage rates wage earners ill W380x10 the Paints and Varnish Industry 
0.0153 0.0109 
0.0043 0.00 
n.0004 0.0070 Constant :;:: 8.7982 
0,0039 0.0017 R2 
.9703 0.0003 0,0016 '" 
0,0024 F ::::: 32.7298 -0.0000 dw 2.0673 
-0.0197 0.0100 
0.0360 0.0302 
0.2680 0.1199 
0.0103 0.0241 
Annual profits 
Toilet Goods 
Coefficients 
-0.4852 
-0.0290 
-0.2942 
0.0407 
-0.0138 
0.0174 
0.3482 
1. 0247 
-3.5291 
0.6170 
-5- Annual hours wo 
V 383x10 Pharmaceuticals, 
-1),0076 
0.0015 
-0.0047 
-0.0014-
0.0020 
-0.0001 
0.0152 
0.0251 
-0.1080 
0,0223 
. Pharmaceuticals , 
Cosmetics industry 
Standard Errors 
0.2700 
0.0979 
108. 
0.1724 Constant 
0,0424 R2 
0.0417 F 
0.0596 dw 0.2486 
8050,4077 
0.7440 
2.9531 
0,5957 
:::: 
.8355 
5.0804 
1 2859 
d by wage earners the 
Toilet Goods and Cosmetics 
0.0079 industry 
0.0028 Constant:::: 173.5697 
0.0050 R2 = .9770 
0.0012 F = 42.5447 ~:~~i~ dw 1.4429 
0.0072 
0.0218 
0.0865 
0.0174 
Hourly rates for wage earners in the 
Pharmaceuticals, Toilet Goods and Cosmetics 
0.0149 
0.0013 
0,0087 
0,0047 
-0.0007 
-0.0032 
0.0187 
-0,0278 
0,2897 
-0,0752 
0.0123 
0.0044 
dustry 
0.0079 Constant :::: 330.5457 
.7916 
3.7985 
2.6409 
0,0019 R2 
0.0019 F 
0.0027 dw 0.0114 
0.0341 
0,1354 
0.0273 
:::: 
:::: 
:::: 
-3 - Annual profits in the PhaTmaceuticals, 
M383xlO Toilet Goods and Cosmetics industry 
0.0882 r IS 2 
(J,0603 0.05 5 
- O. 0739 0,09/8 Constant :::: 4201.2686 
0.0183 0,0240 R2 0.0010 0,0236 "" .9504 
0.0071 0.0338 F 19.1716 
0.2552 0,1410 dw :: 2.2477 
0.5671 0.4221 
- L 6438 L 6756 
0,1600 0,3380 
1 
-5 - Annual hours wo d by wage earners the 
V389 xlO Chemical Products Industry n.e,i. 
Coeffi ents 
0,0024 
0.0033 
o 0012 
0.0000 
0.0027 
0,0023 
0,0024 
0.0121 
0.0633 
0.0064 
Standard Errors 
0.0068 
0,0024 
0,0043 
0.0010 
0,0010 
0,0015 
0,0063 
0,0189 
0,0752 
0.0151 
tant :::;; 56.9383 
:::: .9831 
58.4685 
== 2,4170 
11'f xl0 3 - ly wage rates ,for vv'age earners ln the 
, 389 Chemical Pro Industry n e, i. 
0,0066 0.0113 
0,0066 0.0041 Constant :: 98,2697 
0.0073 0.0072 
0.0028 0.0017 :;;;; .9085 
-0,0015 0.0017 F :::: 9.9393 
0,0040 0.0025 dw :::: 1.6533 
-0.0124 0.0104 
-0,0497 0.0311 
0.1182 0,1237 
0.0122 0.0249 
3 -Annual pro ts in the Chemical Products 
Industry n.e.i. 
-0.0157 
-0.0183 
,,0.0470 
0.0047 
0.0363 
-0.0535 
0.2074 
0.4440 
-0,8578 
0.2715 
0.3448 
0.1250 
0.2201 
0.0541 
0.0533 
0.0761 
0.3175 
0.9501 
3,7712 
0.7607 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
875,4409 
.8739 
6.9308 
2.706 
-3 - Annual hours worked by wage earners in the 
V390 x10 Petroleum and Coal Production Industry 
-0,0122 
0.0091 
-0.0122 
-0,0099 
0.0073 
0,0047 
0.0596 
f).0027 
-0.3940 
0.0212 
0.0300 
0,0108 
0,0191 
0.0047 
0.0046 
0.0066 
0.0276 
0.0827 
0.3283 
0.0662 
Constant == 
R2 
F 
dw 
= 
573.0690 
,9715 
34,1375 
2.5050 
liO. 
Hourly wage rates for wage earners in the 
Petroleum and Coal Produc~lon Industry 
Cae icients Standard Errors 
-0.0991 0,0963 
0.0221 0.0349 
~0.0704 0.0614 Constant '" 3228.4325 
0.024:' 0.0151 R2 
.4333 0.0013 0.0148 F 
'" .7648 0.0169 0.0212 dw 1.7607 0.1261 0.0886 
0.2613 0.2653 
L 3398 1.0531 
0.0155 0.2124 
M 10- 3 - Annual profits the . 
390 x Talcum and Coal Production Industry 
0.4059 
0.0457 
-0.2953 
-0.0459 
0,0107 
0.0164 
0,6908 
0.8370 
-5,8122 
0,3984 
0.2387 
0,0865 
0.1524 
0.0375 
0.0369 
0.0527 
0.2198 
0.6577 
2.6107 
0.5266 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
V
393
X10- 3 - Annual hours worked by wage earners 
- ~ituminousand Coal Products Industry 
0.0475 0.0287 
0.0086 0.0104 
0.0341 0.0183 Constant; 
-0.0005 0.0045 2 
0,0003 0.0044 R :::: 
0.0034 0.0063 F 
-0.0503 0,0264 dw ~ 
-0.1298 0,0791 
0.6604 0.3142 
0.0291 0.0633 
7955.8086 
.9712 
33.7406 
2.2713 
the 
1137.7728 
.9398 
15.6204 
1. 5992 
- Hourly wage rates r wage earners 
Bituminous and Coal Proaucts Industry 
-0.0014 0,0291 
0.0014 0,0105 
0.0008 0.0186 
0.0035 0.004SConstant = 10,8459 
0.0045 0.0045 2 
-0,0050 0,0064R 
0,0039 0.0268F 
0,0186 0,0802dw 
-0.0406 0.3186 
0,0626 0.0642 
= 
.8016 
4.0424 
1.8976 
111. 
- 3 - Annual p M 9 xlO . 3 3 BItumInous and Coal Products Industry 
its in the 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
-0.0593 0,0584 
0.0007 0.0211 
··0.0394 0.0372 
-0.0090 0.0091 ·Constant ::: 1285 5065 
-0.0017 0.0090 'R 2 ,8389 
0.0057 0,0129 1F 5.2086 
0.0665 0.0537 jdw 
'" 1.5296 0,1804 0.1609 
0.5611 0.6387 
0.0564 0,1288 
- 4 - Annual hours worked by wage earners In the V450x10 Range Making Industry 
0.0015 0.0089 
0.0026 0.0032 
-0.0015 0.0057 .Constant ::: 210.8228 
0,0001 0.0014 IR2 :::: 
.5914 0.0038 0,0013 F ::0 1. 4477 0,0015 0.0019 dw 2.2708 := 0.0010 0.0082 
-0.0021 0.0246 
0.0129 0.0978 
-0.0065 0.0197 
3 Hourly wage rates for wage earners in the W450 x10 Range ~.1aking Industry 
0,0080 0.0098 
0.0002 0.0035 
0,0079 0.0062 
0,0012 0.0015 Constant 19.4395 
0,0014 0.0015 R2 
.8797 0.0021 :::: 0,0000 F "" 7.3143 
-0,0082 0.0090 dw 2.9692 = 
-0.0125 0,0271 
0.0801 0.1078 
0,0328 0.0217 
-3 
- Annual pro ts in the M450xl0 Range Making Industry 
-0.0400 0.0775 
-0.0200 0.0281 
-0,0539 0.0495 Constant 300.9340 0.0406 0.0121 
R2 0.0396 0.0119 "" .8110 
0.0159 0.0171 F :::;: 4.2911 
0.1208 0.0714 dw '" 3.0757 
0.2022 0.2137 
F1.44S0 0,8483 
0.3623 0.1711 
V45S xlO 
4 - Annual hours wo by wage earners 
Radio and T.V. sembly Industry 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
0.7627 0.9390 
0.1989 003405 
0.4019 0,5994 
. Constant 0.0673 0.1475 
0.0999 0.1451 . R2 
0, 0139 0.2074 F 
0.3398 0,8645 dw 
-1.1696 2.5870 
5.5435 10.2681 
-2,0470 2,0713 
Hourly wage rates for wage earners 
Radio and T,V. sembly Industry 
0.0392 0.0231 
-0.0058 0.0083 
0,0282 0,0147 
0,0034 0.0036 
-0.0005 0.0035 
0.0048 0.0051 
-0.0337 0,0213 
-0.1701 0,0637 
0,3540 0,2530 
0.0314 0.0510 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
10 - 3 - Annual profits in the 
ssx Radio and T V. Assembly Industry 
-0.4381 0,9096 
-0,3130 0.3299 
-0.3721 0.5806 
-0.1016 0.1429 Constant 
-0.0479 0.1406 R2 0,2009 -0.0347 
F 0,7701 0.8375 dw 4,7478 2.5060 
~6,4702 9.9468 
L 8208 2,0065 
- 4 ~ Annual worked by earners 
V459 xlO Electrical Machinery I try 
~0,037S 0,0423 
the 112. 
4149.0359 
,2842 
.3972 
2.2719 
the 
"" -833,061C 
:: .6648 
1.9837 
"" 2.2472 
:: -203.073~ 
:: ,7439 
:::: 2,9051 
"" 
2.0170 
in the 
0,0120 0,0153 Constant - 476.8937 
-0,0299 0,0270 
-0.0079 0,0066 RZ ::::: .9849 
0,0112 0.0065 F '" 65,5533 
0,0065 0.0093 dw ::::: 1.8919 
0.1256 0.0390 
0.1783 0.1167 
0.9754 0.46 4 
0.1574 0,09 4 
M459 xl0 
-4 
113. 
Hourly wage rates for wage earners in the 
Electr al Mach ry Industry 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
0.0083 0.0074 
0,0010 0,0027 
0,0041 0.0047 Constant := 82,8660 0.0028 0.0011 
0.0006 0,0011 R2 :: .956 
-0,0010 0.0016 F := 21. 7720 
-0.0107 0.0068 d\V' 1. 7814 
0.0100 0,0205 
0.1543 0,0815 
0.0048 0.0164 
Annual profits in the 
Electric ine Industry 
0 0495 0,0469 
0.0296 0,0170 
0.0253 0.0299 
-0.0076 0.0073 Constant =-181.1567 0,0080 0.0072 
0.0031 0,0103 = .9386 
0.0173 0,0432 F ::::: 15.3006 
0.0249 0.1293 dw :::: 2.3972 
0.0572 0.5135 
-0.0830 o . 1036 
-4 Antiual hours worked by wage earners in the 
V330 x10 Pu, Paper and Paperboard Industry 
0.0287 0.0227 
-0,0051 0.0082 
0.0285 0.0145 
0,0043 0.0035 Constant := 920.8094 
0.0064 0.0035 R2 
.9885 0.0022 0.0050 F 86.2145 0.0603 0.0209 dw 
'" 
2.4493 
-0,1073 0.0627 
0,8656 0.2491 
0.0343 0.0502 
3 - Hourly rates for wa~e earne in the W330 x10 Pulp~ and Paperboard Indus ry 
-0.0418 0.0280 
0.0037 0,0101 Constant 8184.2053 
-0.0226 0.0179 :: 
0.0008 0.0044 R2 ,9421 
0,0006 0.0043 F 16.2822 
0,0016 0.0061 dw 
"" 1.8522 0,0097 0.0258 
0.0997 0.0772 
0,0991 0.3067 
0.0949 0,0618 
114. 
M330 x10 3 - Annual profi tSd in theb Pulp, Paper an Paper 0 Industry 
Coe icients Standard rors 
1.0093 
-0.0491 
-0.6767 
0.3190 
0.0994 
0.0365 
1,4 7 
3.8065 
-10.3082 
-0.1890 
S ZOO XIO-
4 (000)-
0.4982 
0.1807 
0,3180 
0.0783 
0,0770 
0.1100 
0.4587 
L 3727 
5.4486 
1.0991 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
29556.3082 
'" .9627 
:= 25.8228 
2.2915 
Pulp, Paper anJ Paperboard Industry 
-0.0364 
0.0031 
-0.0251 
-0.0034 
0.0011 
0.0024 
0.0385 
0.1124 
-0.2929 
0.0138 
- 3 
S20Sx10 (000)-
Pulp, 
0.0075 
-0.0094 
0.0040 
~0.0040 
0.0021 
-0.0013 
0,0028 
0,0252 
0.0941 
0.0206 
Saus 
-0,0025 
0.0007 
0.0020 
0.0006 
0.0005 
-0.0001 
0.0036 
0.0075 
-0.0289 
-0.0063 
Paper 
0.0199 
0.0072 
0.0127 
0.0031 
0.0030 
0.0044 
0.0183 
0.0549 
0.2179 
0.0439 
Constant ::: 
R2 
F :::: 
d\v = 
974.3446 
.9583 
22.9903 
2,1883 
and Paperboard 
0,0118 
0.0043 
Industry 
0.0075 
0.0018 
0.0018 
0.0026 
0.0109 
0.0327 
0.1300 
0.0262 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
:::: 
'" 
144,2140 
.9701 
32.5145 
1.6362 
Casings 
0.0043 
0.0015 
0.0027 
0.0006 
0.0006 
0.0009 
o . 0039 
0,0118 
0.0470 
0.0094 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
'" 112,S569 
.8015 
= 4,0386 
:: 1. 7086 
lIS. 
Brewing of Ale and Stout, and Malting 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
0,0109 0.0189 
0.0052 0.0068 
0,0049 0,0121 Constant 0,0028 0,0029 '" -40.0532 
0,0015 0.0029 R2 :::; 
.9707 
0,0000 0,0041 F :::: 33.1953 
0.0223 0,0174 dw :,4613 
0,0377 0,0523 
-0.0851 0,2076 
0,0064 0.0418 
S xlo- 3 (000) Aerated Waters and Cordial 
236 
-0,0022 0,0090 
-0,0076 0,0032 
0.0000 0.0057 Constant -119.4876 0.0005 0.0014 
:= 
0,0009 0.0013 R2 
'" ,9758 
~0.0019 0,0019 F ::::: 40,3949 
-0,0039 0.0083 dw :::: 1,7666 
-0.0019 0.0249 
0,1072 0,0988 
0,035 0,0199 
-3 
S251x10 (000) Woollen Milling 
-0,0213 0,0146 
0,0016 0,0053 
~0,0120 0,0093 Constant :::: 199.6596 
-0.0011 0,0022 
0,0041 0.0022 R2 :::: .9915 
0.0027 0,0032 F 1iL6,6897 
0,0399 0.0134 dw :::: 1. 6920 
0,0560 0,0402 
0,2750 0,1599 
0,0739 0.0322 
~ 3 
Hosiery S260x10 (000) and 0 r Knitting lIs 
-0,0413 0, 0391 
0.0016 0,0141 
0,0210 0,0249 
~0,OO07 0,0061 Constant 799,7080 0.0015 0.0060 
0,0026 0,0086 = ,9646 
0.0382 0,0360 F ::: 27,3071 
0,1353 0.1078 dw := 2,0057 
0.1964 0,4280 
0,0733 0,0863 
116~ 
8 Z6Z xlO 2(000) Phorium Flax 
Coefficients 8ta rd Errors 
0.0058 0,0325 
0,0062 0.0118 
0,0004 0,0208 
0,0001 0,0051 onstant :::: 172,0261 
-0.0036 0.0050 RZ ::::: .6139 
-0.0009 0,0072 F 1. 5903 
0.0124 0.0300 dw 1.4480 
-0.0249 0.0898 
0.0714 0,3564 
-0.0099 0.0719 
8 26 10 2(000) Linen Flax 
0,0103 0,0178 
0.0056 0,0064 
0,0062 0.0113 
0.0023 0.0028 Constant :::: -359.9550 
-0,0011 0.0027 R2 
.7317 
-0.0019 0.0039 
.F :::: 2.7279 
-0,0042 0.0164 dw =: 2.1565 
0,0177 0.0491 
0,0108 0.1949 
0.0287 0.0393 
8 27 +x10 (000) eds for Animals Fowls 
0.0112 0.0083 
-0.0022 0.0030 
.,.0,0065 0.0053 
-0.0034 0.0013 Constant 360.7402 
0.0009 0.0012 R2 
,9607 0,0017 0.0018 
0.0120 0.0077 F 
:::: 24,4725 
0,0354 0,0230 dw 
::::: 2,2325 
-0.0875 0,0915 
0.0291 0,0184 
S300 x1O 4 (000) Sawmills 
~0.0015 0,0124 
,,0,0017 0,0045 
0,0003 0.0079 
0,0013 0.00 Constant 45.1753 
0.0001 0,0019 R2 
.4673 0.0000 0,0027 '" 
-0,0043 F 
:::: 
.8 7 74 0,0114 dw 2,3407 
",b.0158 
:::: 
0,0342 
-0.0274 0,1369 
0,0279 0,0274 
-3 
Pulp, 
Coefficients 
-0.0602 
-0.0100 
-0.0250 
0.0033 
-0.0098 
-0.0113 
0.0322 
0.2123 
0.2956 
0.1303 
I' 
S 
0.0480 
0.0174 
0.0306 
0.0075 
0.0074 
0,0106 
0.0442 
0.1322 
0.5249 
0.1059 
rboard 
Errors 
Constant :::: 325.0486 
R2 :::: .9919 
F ::::: 123.6741 
dw :::: 2.7152 
S 360 x 1 0 ( 0,0 0 ) Mot 0 icle Tyres and Tubes 
0.0042 
-0.0092 
0.0035 
0.0030 
-0.0050 
-0.0042 
-0.0034 
0.0113 
0.1861 
0.0097 
0.0088 
0.0031 
0.0056 
0.0013 
0.0013 
0.0019 
0.0081 
0.0242 
0.0963 
0.0194 
Constant ::::: 
R2 
F 
dw ::::: 
112.7300 
.9900 
100.0027 
1.8757 
-3 
S363x10 (000) Rubber Goods (Other than 
Tyres and Tubes) Motor vehicle 
0.0231 0,0141 
0.0012 0.0051 
0.0192 0.0090 
0.0030 0.0022 
0.0010 0.0021 
0.0012 0.0031 
0.0033 0.0130 
-0.0335 0,0389 
0.2257 0.1546 
0.0154 0.0311 
S366 X10 - 3 (OOO) sing and Tyre 
0.0207 0.0141 
-0.0063 0.0051 
0.0140 0.0090 
0.0021 0.0022 
-0.0010 0.0021 
0.0037 0,0031 
-0.0353 0.0130 
0.0840 0.0389 
0.4421 0.1544 
0,0065 0,0311 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
tre 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
:::: 
:::: 
:::: 
-547.3258 
.9906 
106.2633 
2.1540 
-443.7406 
,9147 
10.7262 
1.3956 
Coe icients 
-0.0144 
0.0009 
-0.0064 
-0.0008 
-0,0038 
0.0011 
0.0155 
0.0523 
-0.1081 
0.0657 
118. 
rtilisers 
Standard Errors 
0.0134 
O. 0048 Constant = 
0.0086 2 
0.0021 R 
0.0020 F 
0.00 29 dw 
0.0124 
85.9183 
.9784 
=: 45.4721 
2.8151 ::::: 
0.0371 
0.1474 
0.0297 
S372X10-1(OOO) Vegetable and An 1 Oils and Fats 
-0.0081 0.0045 
-0.0030 0.0016 
-0.0040 0.0029 
-0.0014 0.0007 Constant :::: 187.3197 
0.0016 0.Q007 R2 
.9502 0,0002 0.0010 
:::: 
0.0009 0.0042 F 
::::: 19.0905 
0.0119 0.0125 dw 2.3192 
0.0083 0.0499 
0.0105 0.0100 
S377 x10 - 3 (000) Soap 
0.0067 0.0143 
0.0053 0.0052 
0.0092 0.0091 
0,0065 0,0022 Constant 27.6357 
-0.0029 0.0022 
-0.0003 0.0031 R2 .9351 
-0.0212 0.0132 F ::::: 14.4203 
-0.0602 0.0395 dw 2.8121 
0.2647 0.1568 
-0.0268 0.0316 
S380 X10 - 3 (OOO) Paint and Varnish 
-0.0016 0,0182 
-0.0021 0.0066 
0.0080 0.0116 
-0.0056 0.0028 Constant '" 97.2857 0.0000 0.0028 R2 0.0027 0.0040 :::: .9832 
-0,0078 0.0168 F :: 58.7515 
",0.0058 0.0503 dw := 2.0111 
O.2472~ 0.1999 
0.0190 0.0403 
119. 
S383X10~3(OOO) Pharmaceuticals, Toilet Goods and Cosmetics 
Coefficients 
-0.0077 
-0.0008 
-0.0040 
0.OrOl05 
0.0005 
-0.0018 
0.0273 
0.0840 
-0.1094 
0.0429 
Standard Errors 
0.0114 
0.0041 
0.0072 
0.0017 
0,0017 
0.0025 
0.0105 
0.0314 
0.1247 
0.0251 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
:::: 30.5852 
::: .9934 
=151.6836 
= 2.4252 
Chemical Products n.e.l. 
0.0065 
-0.0138 
0.0097 
0.0054 
-0.0013 
~0.0035 
-0.0080 
-0.0278 
0.4772 
0.0893 
- 3 
S 39 3x1 0 (000) £i tuminous 
-0.0080 
-0.0007 
-0.0072 
-0,0034 
0.0005 
-0.0006 
0.0092 
0.0421 
,-0.0452 
0.0028 
0.0323 
0.0117 
0.0206 
0.0050 
0.0049 
0.0071 
0.0297 
0.0891 
0.3537 
0.0713 
Constant ::: 
R2 
F 
dw ::: 
765.8021 
.9897 
96.7308 
1.8053 
Paving and 
0.0095 
0.0034 
0.0060 
0.0014 
0.0014 
0.0021 
0.0087 
0.0262 
0.1040 
0.0209 
Roofing Material 
Constant ::: 
R2 . 
F 
dw 
= 
= 
::: 
243.4646 
.9306 
13,4169 
2.0393 
- 3 S450x10 (000) Range Making 
0.0163 
0.0038 
0.0107 
0.0005 
0.0066 
0.0019 
-0.0104 
-0.0382 
0.1915 
-0.0184 
0.0111 
0.0040 
0.0071 
0.0017 
0.0017 
0.0024 
0.0102 
0.0306 
0,1216 
0,0245 
Constant ::: 
R2 
F 
dw 
::: 
::: 
::: 
-181.4949 
.9647 
27.3984 
1.7769 
120. 
Radio and Television Assembly 
Coefficients Standard Errors 
0,0043 
~O,0129 
-0.0035 
-0.0085 
0.0038 
~0.0002 
0.0574 
0.1846 
-0.3145 
0.1166 
0.0278 
0.0100 
0.0177 
0.0043 
0.0043 
0.0061 
0.0256 
0.0766 
0.3 42 
0.0613 
10- 3 (000) Electric~l Machinery, 
and RepaIrs 
-0.101Jl 
0.0097 
0,0762 
-0,0065 
0.0122 
-0.0085 
0.2505 
0.4037 
L 784:i . 
0.2686 
0.0575 
0.0208 
0.0367 
0.0090 
0.0088 
0.0127 
0.0529 
0.1584 
0.6288 
0.1268 
Constant 
R2 
F 
dw 
:::: 
:::: 
Appliances 
Constant ;;::: 
R2 
F 
dw 
= 
:::: 
-575.4518 
.9817 
53.7596 
2.4 6 
n. e. i. 
1139.3634 
.9940 
165.7511 
1, 5564 
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EFFECTS OF MODIFYING NAFTA: PREDICTIONS FROM THE REDUCED 
FORl\1 
All goods imported to New Zealand are subject to 
import quotas and there is a variety of export subsidies for 
manufactured goods. The classification of goods imported 
differs from, and is finer than the classification of 
industries in the New Zealand statistics. Even goods which 
are exported are subject to an import quota - a coincidence 
which may be explained by the export subsidy, by market shar-
ing agre~ments between internationally related firms within 
Nafta (or outside it) or by non comparable statistical 
classifications of goods. Of the twenty five industries only 
two export a significant proportion of their output to 
Australia. Their 1972 figues are for 10% for Range Making 
together with Radio and Television Assembly and 13% for the 
Manufacture of Paper and Paper Products. From this it is 
assumed that the small amounts exported by the remaining 23 
industries arise either from public or privately induced 
market distortions or from non comparable statistical class-
ifications. One is then permitted to assert that, were it not 
for the various protective or distorting devices, New Zealand 
would supplement the local output of the twenty three indus-
tries by imports. For estimating purposes it is assumed that 
none of the twenty five industries would supply the entire 
New Zealand demand for the goods they produce if there were 
a free trade situation. 
Many variations to the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade 
Agreement may be conceived. One of the general interest to 
free traders and to protectionists alike is to consider the 
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effects of a cet. par. tantaneous e1 ion the New 
Zealand tari on the Aus ian goods which the twenty five 
industr s also produce. It lS assumed doing this that 
the reason the products of only two of the twenty-five 
industries are imported Australia is because of pro-
hibitive protection of New Zealand industry, import quotas 
being beyond the scope of the NAFTA protocol, It is suppos-
ed that reducing the exist tariff on a good produced in 
Australia lowers the New Zealand price of the good by the 
amount of the tariff reduction. An estimate of dy, the 
change in income generated by twenty five manufacturing 
industries as result of expanding the New Ze and-Australia 
Free Trade Agreement in this way, is then available. One 
calculates the effects of the price changes on the principal 
components and then applies estimated coe icients from 
the reduced form to the changed principal components of prices 
to obtain an estimated change in the income rated in the 
twenty five industries using equation (13). 
The figure obtained in this way for the estimated 
e ct of eliminat the tariff against the imports from 
Australia of the goo produced by 
s is an income change of $3.6m [3] 
twenty five industr-
[3] No confidence erval is given because of the non 
linearities lved, as explained earlier. The pre-
diction is a po estimate of effects of a change 
tariffs when non price exogenous variables are 
at their mean values. The e cts of the tari change 
on prices have been calculated om the means of 
price princ al components. 
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The estimated change in income generated in the man-
tifacturing industries, after the tariff reduction of $3.6m 
compares with a mean income for the sample period of $284m. 
Wage incomes for the twenty five industries are estimated to 
change by $4,9m (mean $183,7m), salaries to change by $3.9m 
(mean $20,6m) and profits to change by - $5,2m (mean $77,8m), 
Detailed predictions of the changes in average wage 
incomes, in average salary incomes, in manufacturing sur-
pluses - the proxy for profit from which it varies by the 
depreciation charges and the changes in average incomes 
generated are presented in Table I for each industry. The 
mean for each variable is also given there for the sample 
period, 
Table I 
General Equilibrium effects. Estimated effects on 
Average Annual Wage Incomes, Salary Incomes, Profits 
and Total Incomes Generated in TWenty Five Industries 
of Eliminating the Tariffs on Imports-from Australia 
S~T~I .. C~ Industry Salary 
Classification deflated $(000) $ (000) 
Average Change Average 
200 38046 5220 78 
205 1816 '466 148 3572 
207 308 23 36 517 172 
232 2508 666 2150 11374 2528 
236 844 274 24 - 118 3082 
251 5235 588 1622 6763 
260 5728 1080 -1802 10928 
262 
- 42 20 - 156 303 - 202 
263 70 - 28 12 4 7 46 75 27+ 19488 598 -2526 29746 
300 2222 680 3880 2338 3514 
330 202 1424 4730 5244 
360 2974 516 6 3592 
363 2702 2600 580 3098 
366 78 348 1472 1570 
370 1750 522 68 2876 432 - 1248 
372 702 890 196 0 734 1238 
377 655 74 354 32 1096 - 376 
380 10976 3578 702 22 2058 232 3834 
383 
-10794 752 46 2292 292 -10454 
389 18929 510 1094 2 2872 560 
390 7 178 1982 1 1952 
393 349 96 160 554 272 402 
450 1603 298 740 -40 
455 872 680 -8 2966 2394 1514 
459 352 1806 538 6240 -2832 -1942 I---' N 
4,950 20,601 3, 2 77,848 ':";52 3,662 
...,. 
Errors cross totals due to 
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Dissaggregating the changes to the industry by 
industry level shows that income generated rises in 17 of 
the 25 industries so that the factors who gain in those 
industries should be able to compensate the losers in those 
industries. Incomes decline in 8 of the industries so com-
pensation within each of those industries is not possible. 
A decline in the profit income or ln the labour income ln an 
industry does not imply that the industry will vanish or even 
that its physical output will decline. There is a small 
number of puzzles in the Tabfe I. Concerning the Meat 
Freezing and Preserving Industry (Industry 200), perhaps 
the assumption that New Zealand would import from Australia 
the commodities produced by this industry is unjustified. 
If such is the case the tariff reduction in fact 
should be interpreted as a decline in the export price 
which would account for the income losses. The remaining 
puzzles require detailed knowledge of particular industries, 
if they are to be resolved, 
CONCLUSION 
Overall it is estimated that eliminating the tariff 
on the goods produced in Australia increases the average 
income generated in the twenty five New Zealand industries 
by a miniscule $3.6m or about 1%. This is a grain of evi-
dence that there is water in the New Zealand tariff; as a 
whole the group of industries would not, it seems, be seri-
ously affected if the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agree-
ment were modified by New Zealand moving to tariffs of zero 
on goods produced by the group. Accepting the estimates at 
their face value suggests that wage and salary incomes would 
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be increased over all by about 2% and 20% respectively. 
Profits i.e. manufacturing surplus are estimated to decline 
by about eight percent which is probably comparable to their 
annual fluctuation - scarcely cause for concern. Neither 
the employment nor the industrial infrastructure apologists 
for the New Zealand tariff find their positions reinforced 
by these estimates. From these figures it would appear 
that protectionists should not consider that the elimination 
of tariffs on imports from Australia would have disastrous 
effects on these New Zealand industries as a whole. One 
point must be emphasised; $3.6m is a twenty five industry 
general equilibrium estimate of what would happen if all 
the tariffs on goods produced in Australia and similar to 
the goods produced by the twenty five industries were 
simultaneously removed. A piecemeal reduction in tariffs 
has effects which could be estimated using the techniques 
presented above but none of the estimates in Table I can 
be used as estimates for the piecemeal case. 
Finally, if these estimates are to be believed, 
New Zealand has something to bargin with in any renegotiation 
of the New Zealand-Australia Free Trade Agreement. It would 
not suffer a manufacturing income loss with respect to the 
elimination of its tariffs against Australia so it is in a 
position to offer an overall elimination of the tariffs on 
Australian goods. In return for offering such an across the 
board concession to Australia, instead of the piece-meal 
approach on individual goods, it may expect reciprocation. 
To the best of the writer's knowledge the across the board 
approach to that Free Trade Agreement has never been 
seriously examined elsewhere. 
127. 
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APPENDIX I 
The rates of tariffs which were then assumed to be reduced 
to zero are given in this appendix, A corresponding reduc-
tion in the New Zealand domestic price then occurs, from the 
small country assumption, The estimated price changes from 
their means were then incorporated into the three principal 
components of prices and the effects of such changes on the 
means of hours worked, wage rates, salaries and profits pre-
dicted as explained in Chapter IV, 
Industry 
200 
205 
207 
232 
236 
251 
260 
262 
263 
27+ 
300 
330 
363 
366 
370 
372 
377 
380 
383 
389 
390 
393 
450 
455 
459 
1:SU. 
THE TYPES OF PROTECTION ON THE PRODUCTS OF 
THE N.Z. INDUSTRIES STUDIED 
N. Z. Tari N.Z. Tariff on 
Item No. Imports from Australia 
02.01 Beef 10%, Mutton Free, 
02.01 Free 
05,04 Free 
22.03 22% est. 
22.01 17~% 
53.11,048/051 32~% 
60,03 10 % est. 
54.01 e 
54.01 Free 
61. 01 32~% 
44.04 Free 
47 & 48 27~% 
40.08,003 Free 
20% 
31. 01 Free 
15.12 22~% 
34,01 27~% 
32. Free 
" 33 
II 
" 27 
" 
85,11.009 32~% 
85.15 32~% 
85.06 25% 
Quota or 
No Quota 
No Quota 
II 
It 
Quota 
II 
II 
If 
No Quota 
" Quota 
If 
No 
It 
Quota 
Quota 
No Quota 
Quota 
It 
!! 
fl 
Quota 
No Quota 
No Quota 
Quota 
II 
II 
Sources (a) The Customs Tar of New Zealand, 1974, 
New Zealand Customs Dept. 
(b) The New Zealand Department of Trade and Industry, 
and the N.Z. Customs Dept. 
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